Science, Technology & Innovation Studies Vol. 2 (2006), No 2 (November) by unknown
 STI 
Studies 
 
 
Science, Technology & Innovation Studies 
Vol. 2 (2006), No 2 (November) 
 
 
Content 
 
Ingo Schulz-
Schaeffer 
Raymund Werle 
Johannes Weyer 
 
Editorial 
Next Generation Technologies 
80 
Stefan Kaufmann Land Warrior. 
The Reconfiguration of the Soldier in the 
"Age of Information" 
 
81 
Andreas Lösch Means of Communicating Innovations. 
A Case Study for the Analysis and Assess-
ment of Nanotechnology’s Futuristic Visions 
 
103 
Johannes Weyer Modes of Governance of Hybrid Systems. 
The Mid-Air Collision at Ueberlingen and the 
Impact of Smart Technology 
 
127 
 
 
ISSN: 1861-3675 
 
www.sti-studies.de
  
 
 
 
Science, Technology & Innovation Studies Vol. 2, Nov. 2006 
STI 
Studies 
www.sti-studies.de 
 
 
Editorial 
Next Generation Technologies 
 
This second issue completes the first entire volume of the STI Studies. Additionally, 
the volume includes the first special issue of our journal. When we launched the 
journal in summer 2005, it was still an exciting question whether we would be able 
to attract a reasonable number of good papers. A total of thirteen articles pub-
lished this year, however, shows that there is need of a peer reviewed online jour-
nal addressing social research on science, technology, and innovation. Admittedly, 
we are sometimes struggling to complete an issue in time. Coping with the review-
ers’ recommendations and stipulations is time consuming and causes delays on 
the side of the authors. But we have committed ourselves to take the peer review 
process seriously. Thanks to responsible and thorough reviewers the peer review 
has turned out to be a valuable and well functioning instrument for achieving high 
quality but at the same time resulted in several rejections and many “revise and 
resubmit” decisions. 
The issue contains three papers which deal with next generation technologies – 
and apply different strands of sociological theory as well. In his contribution Stefan 
Kaufmann explores the transformation of the military in the information age, espe-
cially the decentralization of the organization, which is triggered by the utilization 
of smart technology and the networking of electronically equipped units. Andreas 
Lösch shows in his paper, how highly futuristic visions of nanotechnology can 
serve as a means for the facilitation of communication between different actors 
involved, even if they cannot be directly related to strategic interests. Finally, Jo-
hannes Weyer deals with the question of governance of hybrid systems, since smart 
technology allows for the creation of new systems’ designs, e.g. in form of the 
combination of central and decentralized control, which now is on the agenda in 
modern aviation. 
All these case studies try to take a look into the future of modern societies, which 
obviously will be shaped by a new type of technology, that can be labelled "next 
generation technology" – not only because it differs clearly from currently used 
technology, but also because it allows to create new types of social organizations, 
where the "social" and the "technical" meet and interact in an unexpected way. 
Future issues of STI Studies will continue to explore these paths. 
Ingo Schulz-Schaeffer  
Raymund Werle 
Johannes Weyer 
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Abstract 
The U.S. Army is currently working on the development of a new hybrid type of 
infantryman. Land Warrior is the name for the project which aims at equipping the 
dismounted soldiers with wearable computers, head-up display, permanent online 
connection and other technical components. The idea is to link up the dismounted 
soldier to an information and communications network spanning the whole field 
of operation. This project sets the stage for the introduction of a completely new 
type of soldier. It aims not merely at securing a new armament technology, but the 
complete technical and disciplinary reconfiguration of the soldier. The project 
transfers to the micro-level of the soldier the whole set of expectations which the 
military command units and advisers have in mind as a consequence of the ep-
ochal changeover to the "Information Age". The change introduced by information 
technology, so the argument goes, brings with it new kinds of opponents and dan-
gers, but also new opportunities for military strategy. It transforms the entire fabric 
of geo-political and armament technology. Thus it brings the need for a change of 
the rationality of organisation of the military: founded on the plan of a "Network-
centric warfare", there is to be a programmatic re-structuring which extends right 
from the ideas of warfare to the design of the individual soldier. The combination 
of two research perspectives is used as a heuristical guideline for the empirical 
presentation. Fundamental assumptions of actor-network theory, and the idea that 
technical expectations can be seen as far-reaching "prospective structures", lead 
the gaze to the decisive significance of the main expectation, that of standing at 
the threshold of the information age. And they bring into sharper focus the idea of 
network-centric warfare as a programmatic analysis, which translates the technical 
developments into social demands made on organisational structures, procedures 
and cultures; and which, conversely, interprets the military definitions of situation, 
strategic and tactical, as a technological challenge. Drawing on Foucault’s analysis 
of forms of governance and its further extension within governmentality studies, 
this not only allows a systematic treatment of the reconfiguration of the soldier 
which this process of change entails, it also shows how thorough-going and far-
reaching are the transformations of the soldier-subject which are envisioned. And 
the recourse to the Foucauldian perspective at the same time shows us how a net-
work-type coordination of action, encouraging decentrality and self-organisation, 
implicitly requires for its precondition a specific kind of subjectivity structured by 
processes of power. 
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1 Introduction: the Thesis of "The 
Postmodern Military"1 
Land Warrior is the term given to the 
project of reconfiguring the soldier in a 
socio-technical sense by equipping 
him with wearable computers, head-up 
display, permanent online connection, 
and other components. Land Warrior 
is not merely a technical innovation 
along the usual lines of development 
in armament technology. It is much 
rather the innovation of a new type of 
soldier. A soldier-type whose forma-
tion can be seen as both a promise and 
a requirement, an effect and the basis, 
of a new military order: "Today, we are 
on the threshold of a new era, and we 
must proceed into it decisively. Today 
the Industrial Age is superseded by the 
Information Age, the Third Wave, hard 
on the heels of the agrarian and indus-
trial eras. Our present Army is well-
configured to fight and win in the late 
Industrial Age, and we can handle 
Agrarian-Age foes as well. We have 
begun to move into Third Wave War-
fare, to evolve a new force for a new 
century – Force XXI […] Force XXI will 
represent a new way of thinking for a 
new wave of warfare." (Office of Chief 
of Staff of the U.S. Army, 1994; quoted 
in Der Derian 2001: 16-17). 
This quote reflects a far-reaching con-
viction of the military strategic think-
ing of today. The US army leaders are 
taking the "Information Age" as the 
starting point for their situation report. 
Information is determining the forms 
of production and civilisation. The 
information age is producing new op-
ponents, and at the same time it is 
determining the direction for one’s 
                                                       
1 This study was made possible by a re-
search grant from the Deutsche For-
schungsgemeinschaft. I would like to ex-
press my thanks to Prof. Dr. Gerhard 
Tröster, of the Electronics Institute at the 
Zurich ETH, and Mr. Riccardo Sibilia, of the 
Zentrum für Wissenschaft und Technologie 
of Armasuisse, for providing information 
about the technical components of Wear-
able Computing and the Land Warrior Pro-
ject. 
own "evolution". This diagnosis of hav-
ing arrived at the threshold of an ep-
och, with the new threat situation, and 
the state of one’s own forces – all 
these are now to be thought of as 
grouped together, as one unit – such is 
the pivotal concept for the military 
situation report. The horizon of expec-
tations, from this sense of standing at 
the threshold of the information age, is 
here translated into a programme of 
restructuring the military apparatus, 
and this finds expression at the micro-
level as the reconfiguration of the sol-
dier. Land Warrior is the dismounted 
soldier who set up for action in the 
setting of this new age. 
Considering the case of Land Warrior, 
one finds a great significance in the 
general observation of the actor-
network theory that the development 
of technology – be it the individual 
artifacts or entire technologies – al-
ways entails the design of a complete 
"setting", the design of "assemblies of 
human and non-human actants where 
the competences and performances 
are distributed" (Akrich/Latour 1992: 
259). In such "settings" – in French 
dispositifs (ibid) – the roles of humans 
and non-humans are distributed, role 
expectations are formulated, moral 
norms are translated into technical 
functions and technical regulations, 
possible courses of action are shut off 
or opened up. In the Land Warrior 
project, these translations and attribu-
tions are linked to the idea of the dis-
positive, known from the tradition of 
Foucault theory. Foucault applied the 
term "Dispositives of power" (1978) to 
describe the lines of force, rationalities 
of governance, the practical knowl-
edge, procedures and installations, 
which have been directed to the fash-
ioning of specific subjects since the 
18th century.2 And this shows us the 
                                                       
2 Like other theorists who are interested in 
the long-term structural changes of sub-
ject-formation, and who especially look at 
the transition from traditional to modern 
societies, Foucault saw in the military one 
of the central institutions in which the 
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right context for understanding the 
human-to-machine integration which 
the Land Warrior project is aiming at. 
Here it is not merely a case of "pre-
scription, proscription, affordances, 
allowances" (Akrich/Latour 1992: 261), 
for example when one wishes to inte-
grate such items as cat-flaps, street 
kerbing, key-rings, safety belts, and 
door-closers into the human activities 
in programmes of action (Latour 1992, 
1996: 15-83). As will be shown here, 
Land Warrior instead aims at some-
thing of quite a different order, a com-
prehensive reconfiguration of technical 
competencies and military disciplining. 
The principle here is that one does not 
just control this or that action, but 
strives to work on the general capaci-
ties and overall arrangement or dispo-
sitions of people and machines. The 
rationality and full range of this recon-
figuration only become clear when one 
sees the possibilities for action which 
Land Warrior opens up, as a part of a 
more comprehensive programme of 
action. And this is: to manage warfare 
in the Information Age. Or to put it 
more precisely: to re-program the mili-
tary so as to make it fit for warfare in 
the Information Age. 
In order to make clear the basic rea-
soning, the calculation of the economy 
of force, which is driving the Land 
Warrior project forward, one has first 
to outline the processes of transforma-
tion affecting the international balance 
of force, within the frame of which the 
reconfiguration of the military and the 
soldiers is taking place. Taking up the 
key idea of a transition to a "postmod-
ern military", which has now become 
so prominent in military sociology, one 
                                                                  
generally valid forms of governance found 
their model expression. Thus Max Weber 
(1976: 686) for example described the mili-
tary as the "womb" of all discipline. And 
Norbert Elias (1976: espec. 263-283) also 
present a treatment of the structural ho-
mology, mirror-imaging and partial identity 
of the different practices, mechanisms, 
technologies and guidelines of civil and 
military social disciplining and subject 
formation. 
finds that there are four lines which 
can be identified, to describe the way 
this change is manifesting.3 
Firstly, the military field of operation is 
governed by the perception of a new 
kind of threat situation. The whole set 
of military thinking and acting is no 
longer primarily focussed on the nu-
clear threat and on a conventional 
opponent. The activities of warfare and 
coercion by non-government agents 
have developed to the point where 
they represent a challenge to the mili-
tary of Western societies. And the brief 
of the military is redefined accordingly. 
It is no longer just a case of warfare 
against conventional opponents. Now 
the opponent can also be a criminal, a 
drug-baron or a terrorist. As a result 
the brief includes numerous opera-
tions of a non-military nature: "peace-
keeping", "humanitarian assistance", 
"counterdrug" or "counterterrorism" 
(cf. CJCS 2000: 7). 
Secondly, there is the influence of a 
general change of culture which can be 
seen in the forming of the armed 
forces. There is thus the need for an 
adjustment to civil social develop-
ments, and a number of cultural com-
monplaces, dominated by masculine 
groupings, are undermined, for exam-
ple when women are integrated in the 
battle-forces. 
Thirdly, there is a new approach to the 
organisational structure which shows 
the armed forces in a new light. The 
thesis of a "postmodern military" iden-
tifies a gradual erosion of hierarchies, 
and the fixed boundaries between 
types of weaponry, and between battle 
                                                       
3 Cf. the volume by Moskos/Williams/Segal 
(2000), which has now become a standard 
reference, in which the U.S. military is in-
troduced as the paradigm of a "post-
modern military" (Moskos 2000), and then 
following this model the individual aspects 
of the change are listed in sequence for 12 
further Western nations. For the interna-
tional reception of the concept cf. also 
Boëne (2003), and for its adoption by Ger-
man military sociology the omnibus vol-
ume by Kümmel/Collmer (2002).  
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and service troops. Thus the military 
programme of a "Network-centric war-
fare" (cf. Cebrowski/Garstka 1998; Al-
berts/Garstka/Stein 1999; Al-
berts/Hayes 2003) is found to relate 
expressly to the revised new context of 
the current type of new enterprise, 
where one works with de-centralised 
organisation, flat hierarchies, modular 
and task-oriented co-operation, virtual 
teamwork, lean production, and pre-
cise logistics. The military network 
concept, in an analogous way, sees the 
possibility of operating with flexible, 
task-specific procedures, and units put 
together in an ad hoc way. The military 
has to view itself, in fact, as a "net-
work-centric enterprise" (Al-
berts/Garstka/Stein 1999: 89). 
Fourthly, the forces of globalisation, 
with the loss of state sovereignties that 
they entail, are having their effect on 
the constitution of armed forces. The 
missions are increasingly carried out 
at the request of international in-
stances, in co-ordination with other 
armed forces, in an arrangement with 
non-state organisations; indeed the 
troops themselves are often made up 
of international, and not always mili-
tary, forces. 
The basic forces guiding the reorgani-
sation of the military can be deter-
mined by a reference to the thesis of 
the postmodern military. However, the 
term "postmodern military" suggests 
an observation of the transformation 
process in the military field made 
within a given, static typology. The 
typology defines observed trends of 
the change as factual elements of a 
new type of organisation, instead of 
analysing the process of its (potential) 
constitution. What is ignored by this 
form of analysis is a fact which imme-
diately springs to mind when one has 
the perspective of discursive analysis: 
the expectations, plans, programmes 
and projects which are formulated, 
drafted and set in motion by the advi-
sors, officer units, programme leaders, 
project developers, – they are all 
clearly bound and tied up to techno-
logical factors. The first point here is 
that right at the outset the military 
views itself as in the midst of a transi-
tion not to the "postmodern", but to 
the "Information Age", and naturally it 
then sets about handling the central 
components of its transformation 
process accordingly, from this starting 
diagnosis.4 
It is this aspect which we will now take 
up as the fifth line of influence: tech-
nology defining the scope of military 
reorganisation and ultimately that of 
the new dismounted soldier. It will be 
presented in three stages in the follow-
ing sections. (2) Firstly one needs to 
clearly establish what it means if the 
expectations for future development 
are centred on information and the 
information age. (3) Following this 
course of approach, we show how the 
expectations are linked to the planned 
idea of a network-centric warfare 
which attempts to combine a techno-
logical transformation with a recon-
figuration of military organisational 
structure and organisational culture. 
(4) Finally the project of the reconfigu-
ration of the soldier will be studied in 
its following aspects: (4.1) technical, 
                                                       
4 As evidence for the thesis that it is the 
expectation of an information age, and not 
the thesis of postmodernism, which does 
in fact guide military thought, one can 
adduce this example of a statistical sam-
pling. A search for key terms which was 
run on the Internet pages of the U.S. mili-
tary and military-related institutions came 
up with the following results, for "Informa-
tion Age" and "Postmodern". The journal 
"Parameters" issued by the U.S. Army War 
College (<http://carlisle-
www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/>) gave 
72 and 28 hits resp.; the webpage of the 
Strategic Studies Institute (<www.strate-
gicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/>) gave 207 
and 10 hits resp.; and that of the Rand-
Corporation (<www.rand.org/>) 200 and 
28 hits respectively. While these webpages 
mainly refer to publications of strategic 
advisors, planners and think-tank experts, 
on the website of the U.S. Army 
(<www.army.mil>) one finds a great vari-
ety of different articles – from official 
guidelines, to troop reports, to military 
news. Here there was a hit count of 9,520 
and 17 resp. (data gathered on 20.12.2005). 
Stefan Kaufmann, Land Warrior  
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(4.2) skill-related, (4.3) ethical-
normative and (4.4) that of disciplinary 
space. Unlike in the case we men-
tioned of a typological attribution, here 
by applying the concepts of expecta-
tion, programme and project, empha-
sis will be placed on the dynamic and 
mobilising character of the transfor-
mation. 
 
2 Expectations: the Military in the 
Information Age 
One can say that it is now freely ac-
cepted in (technology-related) sociol-
ogy, that expectations about possible 
future technologies direct and guide 
the actions of social actors, that ar-
rangements are made for certain fu-
ture developments.5 The descriptions 
of the society-structuring factor of 
expectations for future technology, are 
strongly coloured by this idea of "pro-
spective structure" (Lente/Rip 1998). 
"Expectations allocate roles for selves, 
others and (future) artefacts. When 
these roles are adopted, a new social 
order emerges on the basis of collec-
tive projections of the future." (ibid 
203) The idea that expectations about 
technical developments are particu-
larly liable to actually becoming a de-
ciding force of structuration, is sup-
ported by the fact that the talk of an 
inevitable technological progress can 
be considered as a central "ideograph" 
for the modern era, and conversely, 
technical progress can be viewed as 
the classic feature of modernity (Lente 
2000). Since the progress in what is 
technologically feasible appears to be 
an evident fact, the step from the pre-
diction of a development – often com-
ing across as tantamount to a promise 
– to the necessity of it happening, is 
readily made (ibid). The predictions of 
                                                       
5 For the role played by future expectations 
about the development of specific tech-
nologies, in ideals, metaphors, science 
fiction, political agendas, cf. Dierkes/Hoff-
mann/Marz 1992; Mambrey/Pateau/Tepper 
1995; Brown/Rappert/Webster 2000; Kon-
rad 2004; Uerz 2004. 
a future technology generally press for 
action. It is precisely these two factors, 
a strong and effective will to fashion 
structures, and a great keenness to 
describe future expectations as neces-
sary requirements, which one can ob-
serve in the present transformations of 
the military. One can track the way the 
idea of the "Information Age" inspires 
the successive unfolding of socio-
technical structures, on three levels of 
social aggregation: it presents general 
guidelines of armament technology, it 
defines the frame of military organisa-
tional alignment, and also the frame 
for the restructuring of the soldier. 
Now we will deal first with the general 
guidelines of strategic armament. 
The concept of the information age is 
linked to a set of expectations which 
are concerned primarily with the 
macro-societal level, predicting a far-
reaching change in all fields of society. 
The main reference for the military 
experts, the "forethinkers", is the work 
of futurologist Alvin Toffler. "Third 
wave" is the metaphor used by Toffler 
(1980) to describe a third wave of ep-
ochal change, which is to bring a 
change in civilisation comparable to 
that caused by the transition to the 
agrarian economy, and to the indus-
trial revolution. Toffler’s diagnosis is 
translated in the military field as a di-
agnosis identifying a "Revolution in 
Military Affairs", a conceptional stan-
dard which has already been given an 
acronym: RMA (cf. Hundley 1999; 
Sloan 2002; Cohen 2004). This refer-
ence to an epochal transition, the 
mention of a revolution, is used to 
support the radicalness of the change 
demanded in the military field, its ur-
gency and its wide scope. Mobilise and 
get ready for a constant change, so 
runs the military programme. "In to-
day’s world, change has become the 
norm, not the exception", this is how 
Frank Fernandez, director of DARPA 
(Defense Advanced Research Projects 
Agency), describes the state of affairs 
(quoted from Der Derian 2001: 102). 
The rhetoric of looking to the future, of 
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radical and permanent change, be-
comes ubiquitous when one speaks of 
RMA. In 1994 the army refers to it as 
"new force", "new century", a "new way 
of thinking" and "Force XXI". Later on 
one finds such concepts as "Army after 
next" and "Future army", presented as 
guidelines for a change of organisa-
tion. And in 1996 the future-oriented 
programme Joint Vision 2010 is issued, 
addressing all the armed forces; fol-
lowed four years later by Joint Vision 
2020 (cf. CJCS 1996, 2000). 
The talk of RMA suggests some far-
reaching technocratic visions. Regard-
ing armament technology, it lays stress 
on the dynamics of technical develop-
ment, especially information and 
communications technology, which is 
said to do away with the existing base 
of military power. No longer does mili-
tary strike-power result primarily from 
the potency of weapons, but rather 
from a superior co-ordination of in-
formation and communications tech-
nology. The expectation transits seam-
lessly into requirement: "The future is, 
as Toffler says, that unless you tame 
technology, we will encounter future 
shock. We’re not only taming technol-
ogy, we are turning technology into 
not future shock, but future security." 
(defence minister William Cohen 1997, 
quoted from Der Derian 2001: 113) The 
RMA caused by information technol-
ogy is going to come anyway, so the 
logic goes, one just has to keep 
abreast of it, at the forefront of it. It is 
certainly clear that efforts in the field 
of armament are concentrating on 
information technologies under the 
head of "digitization". Two techno-
cratic visions are linked to this: that of 
the "transparent battlespace", and that 
of the "precision strike" (cf. Sloan 
2002: 4-9). Surveillance using satel-
lites, planes and low-flying unmanned 
aircraft will – so the prediction goes – 
make all that can be visible, visible, 
using radar as well as thermal and 
optical imaging. And parallel to this, in 
the field of Command and Control, 
there will be sufficient executive power 
to fight everything that can be ob-
served. Warfare in the "Information 
Age" means that one no longer tries to 
gain military strength by individual, 
superior weapons systems, but rather 
by using information and communica-
tions technology to network them, by 
"intelligent munitions" and new sur-
veillance technologies. Certainly such 
visions are an advantage in the strug-
gle for budgets and funding: informa-
tion technologies hold out the promise 
of delivering more performance at less 
expenditure (Adams 1998: 93-101, 
122-137; Sloan 2002: 46-48).6 
In this way the military use of the term 
Information Age draws on a basic 
principle of the sociological thesis of 
an information society: "By informa-
tion society one evidently means a 
recommendation and a program of 
                                                       
6 At this point it would be appropriate to 
add a note about the current state of the 
literature. Most of the publications on the 
subject of this military transformation 
originate from the military sector itself, and 
the military sociological research, too, is 
almost everywhere (this applies especially 
to the USA) institutionally and financially 
tied to military organisations, and accord-
ingly application-oriented (cf. Caforio/ 
Nuciari 2003). Hence we find that mixtures 
of diagnosis and advice are the rule. The 
present study is based on a comprehensive 
analysis of materials about RMA, especially 
the numerous publications of the "think 
tanks" such as the RAND-Corporation or 
the Command and Control Research Pro-
gramme; further, the leading journals in 
the field of military studies have been sys-
tematically evaluated, and here as a pri-
mary reference one can name Parameters, 
the Quarterly of the US Army War College. 
Regarding the change in training, the pub-
lished studies of the U.S. Army Research 
Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sci-
ences have provided a detailed insight into 
the transformatory processes, while a de-
scription of their broader outlines can also 
be found in the texts of military sociology. 
The present article is based to a large ex-
tent on a kind of reading "against the grain" 
of the central programmatic writings, i.e. 
advisory texts and instructions as well as 
the findings of military sociology literature. 
Such an approach in this context was only 
used by the quoted writings of Der Derian 
(2001) and Dillon (2002). 
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action which one wants to impose 
upon a government." (Stichweh 1998: 
438) It is our perception that this 
thread occurs throughout the entire 
sociological works: from the one per-
formed on behalf of the Japanese gov-
ernment which introduced the term 
into the political debate towards the 
end of the 1960’s, up to the now well-
known study by Simon Nora and Alain 
Minc which was ordered by the French 
government in the year 1980, and fi-
nally up to Al Gore’s programme of 
information-superhighways (cf. ibid: 
434-439; Konrad 2004: 41-49). The 
military prognosis participates in 
widespread visions of how controllable 
and manageable technical and social 
progress will be, and takes up the idea 
of a transition from industrial warfare 
to war in the information age, translat-
ing it into the technocratic vision of a 
transition from mass destruction to 
precision warfare (cf. Adams, 1998: 
292-304; Der Derian 2001: xv-vxii). The 
expectations bound up with the infor-
mation age first structure the military 
apparatus in two ways: they prescribe 
the focus for armament technology, 
and they exert an extremely mobilising 
effect by setting the mood for exten-
sive processes of change. 
 
3 Programme of Action: the Net-
work as Prospective Structure 
Finally, the idea of a network-centric 
warfare leads from a general mobilisa-
tion to the actual, concrete programme 
of transformation. The concept was 
introduced into the debate on RMA by 
vice-admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski with 
his co-author John J. Garstka, in 1998, 
and rose to become the programmatic 
guideline for the restructuring of the 
American armed forces. As the "father 
of network-centric warfare" (DoD 
2001), Cebrowski was eventually ap-
pointed director of the Office of Force 
Transformation, which was formed in 
November 2001 with the task of co-
ordinating and promoting the struc-
tural change of the armed forces. 
The entire programme of network-
centric warfare aims at a comprehen-
sive transformation: "Initiating a 
whole-scale re-thinking of the very 
basis of military organization, doc-
trine, force requirements, procurement 
policies, training and operational con-
cepts." (Dillon 2002: 73) The idea de-
rives its effective energy and plausibil-
ity from a variety of heterogeneous 
sources. The factors and procedures of 
structuring the organisation, are 
geared to the new organisational ra-
tionality governing enterprises in the 
economic field, as we have indicated 
earlier. And the idea gains further 
plausibility from the reference to the 
type of organisation of the new oppo-
nents, who are after all themselves, 
too, operating in the networked rather 
than the hierarchical style (Ar-
quilla/Ronfeldt 2001). Furthermore, it 
draws its powers of persuasion from 
considerations of complexity theory, 
which draw parallels between natural 
events as interpreted by chaos theory 
and the nature of warfare, and explain-
ing the societal concept of self-
organisation as a strategy for manag-
ing complexity (Alberts/Czerwinski 
1997; Czerwinski 1998). Finally – and 
this is the point which is to be outlined 
in what follows – the concept of net-
work-centric warfare draws its ration-
ale from the translation of cultural 
forms which have emerged from the 
development of the Internet, into the 
setting of warfare. 
The immediate reasoning, however, is 
that networking is considered to be the 
key to an increase in military strike-
power. The director of the Command 
and Control Research Program David 
Alberts and his co-authors put it like 
this: "We define NCW as an informa-
tion-superiority-enabled concept of 
operations that generates increased 
combat power by networking sensors, 
decision makers, and shooters to 
achieve shared awareness, increased 
speed of command, higher tempo of 
operations, greater lethality, increased 
survivability, and a degree of self-
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synchronization." (1999: 2) In harmony 
with this idea, as one of the central 
initiatives in this transformation, the 
U.S. Defense Department has been 
working on setting up a Global Infor-
mation Grid (GIG) (Libicki 2000). The 
GIG is considered to be an "Internet-
like network for D[epartment]O[f]D[e-
fense]-related operations" (GAO 2004: 
3), a military Internet in which every-
thing is connected, the entire com-
mand and control systems, all the 
weapons platforms, all the soldiers 
down to the individual footsoldier, 
together with other services, from 
weather to the secret service. A pro-
jected date for the basic installation is 
2020, and 21 mill. $ have been set 
aside for the period to 2010 alone. 
This military Internet is the technical 
means to implement the new organisa-
tional structures, procedures and so-
cial behavioural forms – or to put it 
more precisely: the means to initiate 
the "coevolution of organization, doc-
trine, and technology in the warfight-
ing ecosystem" (Alberts/Garstka/ Stein 
1999: 3). The Internet, or an Internet-
type design of information manage-
ment, is conceived as the catalyst for a 
completely new structuring of social 
roles, an entirely new organisational 
culture. On the basis of the GIG, in-
formation management is to be shifted 
from a "platform-centric" to a "net-
work-centric" design, and operated in 
a way akin to the Internet. And this is a 
trend which is diametrically opposed 
to the present military communica-
tions methods. Martin Libicki (1999: 
23) presents these ideas graphically in 
the following sketch (Fig. 1). 
No longer are we to have the scenario 
where the individual battle groups 
have access to specific means of sur-
veillance, and the gathered informa-
tion is then made mutually available to 
each of them. This is how the conven-
tional form of military information 
management is set up. The new 
method now is to have the sensor data 
entered into a common network, and 
then distributed and made retrievable 
via this network, in collated, proc-
essed, stored and administered form. 
The "networking of sensors, decision-
makers and shooters" thus means do-
ing away with the exclusive power of 
certain specific platforms to hold spe-
cific pieces of information. The flow of 
information is to be decoupled from 
the traditional functional and hierar-
chical differentiation. Hierarchies, mo-
nopolies, the asymmetrical control of 
information, are brought into a kind of 
marketplace allocation. The informa-
tion flow is decoupled from the hierar-
chy of command. The powers of in-
formation management are shifted 
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from the sender to the user. No longer 
do those who provide the information 
decide to whom it is to be given, for 
whom it might be of use. They simply 
enter it into the network. Potential 
users decide what they want to do with 
it (Libicki 1999: 71-93; Alberts/Garst-
ka/Stein 2000: 65-68; Albert/Hayes 
2003: 74-82). This is exactly what is 
meant by "shared awareness": the dis-
tribution of information takes place 
not through "stovepipe monopolies" 
but via the GIG, which consists of 
"eclectic, adaptable marketplaces" (Al-
berts/Hayes 2003: 218). 
Even more far-reaching is the proposal 
to radically change the function of 
command. One heuristic approach to 
successful philosophies of command, 
from the 20th century, lays out a series 
of six steps: passing from a manner of 
proceeding which is regulated in a 
detailed fashion and centrally con-
trolled, to operational forms which are 
decentrally controlled by general rules 
and intentions only (Alberts/Hayes 
2003: 18-26). Equipped with network 
technology, one might expect that one 
could potentially operate using all 
types of procedure. But, say the pro-
tagonists of network-centric warfare, 
the optimum in "speed of command" 
und "tempo of operations" can only be 
attained using the latter type of proce-
dure which we have just mentioned: 
"Self-synchronization is perhaps the 
ultimate in achieving increased tempo 
and responsiveness." (Alberts/Garstka/ 
Stein 1999: 175) Self-synchronisation 
means short-circuiting the feedback-
loops of observation, orientation, deci-
sion, action, which are spread out over 
various functioning units, and hence 
also the traditional chain of command 
itself: even before a command is is-
sued, the subordinate instance has 
grasped the situation and anticipated 
the change needed (cf. Wesen-
stein/Belenky/Balkin 2005: 95-97). The 
central entity to which the actors ori-
ent themselves is no longer the com-
mand, but the picture of the overall 
situation, which is circulating in the 
network. 
Military publications have drawn a lot 
from thinkers of the "cyberpunk cul-
ture" described in Wired Magazine (cf. 
Der Derian 2001: 17-18). Here again it 
is not the technocratic vision of central 
control, central management, which is 
given priority, not the technical engi-
neering metaphor of the network. 
Rather it is biological evolution and 
self-organisation which are seen to 
enable the management of unpredicted 
events by a co-ordination of scattered 
knowledge, by organisation using bot-
tom-up processes (cf. Wyatt 2000: 118-
120). The tendency is for the network 
to overlay the chain of command: 
"Unlocking the full power of the net-
work also involves our ability to affect 
the nature of the decisions that are 
inherently made by the network, or 
made collectively, rather than being 
made by an individual entity." (Al-
berts/Garstka/Stein 1999: 105). Collec-
tivist principles are no longer opposed; 
they are incorporated as a productive 
force. The collective takes centre-
stage, the power of position is re-
placed by the effective powers of relat-
edness. Functions are no longer 
hoarded at command posts, now the 
motto is rather "Power to the Edge". 
(Alberts/Hayes 2003: 180-181) 
Following on from the focus on net-
work structures, other factors of ex-
pectation of the information society 
come into play, beside those with the 
stress on the potential for technocratic 
regulation and control. When the pro-
tagonists of network-centric warfare 
refer to an information society, they 
are evidently inspired by media theory 
and inter-cultural flow, for example 
when they refer in an appreciative way 
to the forms of a "distributed social 
order" (Faßler 2001), and this with a 
view to reconstituting the military itself 
as just such a network organisation.
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4 Land Warrior: The Soldier as 
Socio-Technological Project 
The new rationality of organisation, 
and the new organisational culture 
which is emerging along with it, call 
for a redesigning of the soldiers them-
selves. Within the compass of net-
work-based military operations, new 
models of leadership are developed, 
and the infantryman, the simple dis-
mounted soldier, is also thought of in 
a new way. The defining character of 
what goes to make up a soldier is in a 
process of change. 
This change can be described sche-
matically as having four aspects, with 
reference to a general analysis of 
forms of government, meaning the 
forms of governance and self-
formation (cf. Foucault 1986: 37-39; 
Dean 1999: 20-39). 
Firstly, forms of governance always 
work with specific techniques, with a 
certain kind of expertise and know-
how, together with procedures, in-
struments and strategies, to shape 
specific subjects. From this standpoint, 
the predominant feature which charac-
terises the dismounted soldier is that 
he is conceived as a socio-technical 
venture at the height of the informa-
tion age. Here the techniques of sub-
ject-formation lead to a technical hard 
core. 
Secondly, the techniques of governing 
are always informed by a specific 
knowledge, a specific rationality. They 
refer back to an underlying thought-
structure, which determines what can 
be taken as realisable, what can actu-
ally be done. For the new soldier, it is 
the appeal to the network idea itself 
which is the basis for determining 
what the soldier has to learn, in what 
direction, by what methods he should 
be shaped, by what skills he should be 
distinguished. 
Thirdly, the techniques of administra-
tion present a set of duties, of rules, of 
expectations, by means of which the 
subjects are bound and defined. Sub-
jectivity is based on an ethical dimen-
sion, it is not conceivable without 
some ethical foundation. And in the 
context of the network-based recon-
figuration of the soldier the question 
presents itself with fresh urgency, as to 
what should be the professional cul-
ture, the soldierly ethos, the thing 
which marks the soldier apart from all 
other subjects. 
Fourthly, every form of administration 
contains a telos or aim, which means it 
at once brings into play a kind of uto-
pia or utopian ideal. Governing is 
based on programmatic formulations 
and ideas which work on the assump-
tion that subjects can be fashioned in 
the desired manner. And yet at the 
same time, every programmatic ap-
proach draws its energy from the fact 
that programme and reality do not 
match up completely. We will now take 
a closer look at this telos of govern-
ance, which presents a kind of utopian 
ideal, in order to show the special form 
of disciplinary space which is set up in 
operations following the network 
paradigm. 
4.1 The Soldier as Information-
Technology Venture 
During a conference organised for the 
Pentagon by the Oak Ridge National 
Laboratory in 2001, the purpose of 
which was to formulate proposals for 
the visions and plans outlining the 
development of the soldier of the fu-
ture, General Paul Gorman of the Insti-
tute for Defense Analysis and Science 
Board described the general situation 
of the infantryman as follows: 
"The soldier of today is thrust far for-
ward. He is the point of the Army 
spear. It is very lethal and very lonely 
out there. The soldier of tomorrow will 
never be alone and he will advance on 
his enemy shielded by dominant in-
formation. His leaders will be able to 
say this to him: ‘Soldier, you are the 
master of your battlespace. You will 
shape the fight. The network will en-
able you to see all that can be seen. 
You will out-think, out-maneuver and 
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out-shoot your enemy. The Force is 
with you. You are one with the Force.’" 
(NSD 2001, Composite Vision: 2) 
The mobilisation of the future, the 
playing off of the present against a 
predicted technical development to 
come, characterises the forming of the 
soldier. Gorman’s diagnosis of the 
present situation hints at the fact that 
the dismounted soldier was a ne-
glected figure in the military thought of 
the Cold War. There was no place re-
served for him on the highly modern-
ised battlefield, an area possibly even 
contaminated by tactical atomic weap-
onry. The only form one could still 
imagine the infantry taking was in the 
guise of robots. And it was only the 
new threat scenarios which brought 
the infantry back into view. Generally 
the miscarried operation in Somalia of 
1993 – which as "Black Hawk Down" 
has already been turned into a notori-
ous media event – has been styled as 
the starting-point for considering a 
complete overhauling of the infantry 
(Adams 1998: 60-80, 108-111). 
The ultimate soldier of whom Gorman 
speaks was first presented as the 
"Land-Warrior" in 1994. The "Land-
Warrior" was going to be an integra-
tion of the dismounted soldier into the 
information network covering the en-
tire field of battle, by means of wear-
able computer, permanent radio con-
tact, global positioning system, head-
gear with integrated speaker, micro-
phone and optical display, laser range-
finders, day/night cameras and other 
technical devices. The overall idea of 
network-centric warfare is based on 
the feasibility of technically linking up 
the infantryman to the tactical situa-
tion picture, to keep him permanently 
online. The infantryman should not 
merely be fitted out with new pieces of 
equipment. Rather he is projected as 
an integral unity of man and machine 
(Sterk 1997: 69; Schaprian/Rather 
1997). 
Land Warrior is a project in which 
three general expectations for the re-
search into wearable computers are 
spelled out in military terms (Baumeler 
2005: 10-15). Firstly, what the tradi-
tional soldier could learn of just by a 
kind of vague sensing, will be achieved 
by automated context sensitivity: sen-
sors integrated into the uniform and 
distributed at other locations are to 
recognise surroundings which are con-
taminated chemically, atomically or 
biologically, and trigger automatic 
warnings. And also the vague sensing 
of the opponent, and his concealed or 
nocturnal movements, is to be re-
placed by an exact technical viewing, 
such as by thermal-imaging devices. In 
addition to all this, the network pro-
vides the soldier with an augmented 
reality. From getting help with a for-
eign language, to the map showing the 
location of friend and foe, he is to be 
provided with every possible kind of 
supplementary information. He can 
veritably immerse himself in this aug-
mented reality, where information is 
shown to him via a see-through dis-
play, imaged directly into the optical 
field, for example in the form of dis-
tance lines, prohibited areas, or tar-
gets. (NSD 2001, composite vision: 20; 
Wehrtechnischer Report 2003: 31-35). 
Finally, the Land Warrior is to be given 
the capacity for autonomous and pro-
active action. The system should for 
example automatically recognise the 
soldiers’ positions and send out corre-
sponding reports. Bodily functions 
(pulse, temperature) are to be auto-
matically monitored and any irregu-
larities reported. Nano-technologies, 
which are planned for the successor of 
the Land Warrior – the Objective Force 
Warrior, – are to open up even more 
far-reaching possibilities: textiles 
which actively regulate the microcli-
mate, and which register any loss of 
blood and then automatically tighten, 
and which can recognise the sur-
roundings and adapt to them like a 
chameleon (Erwin 2003; Rötzer 2003; 
Shachtman 2004). 
Here, the technique of shaping the 
soldier consists in using this method 
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of fitting of new technologies directly 
onto the body of the infantryman, to 
constantly push the duality of techni-
cal and social into more areas of ac-
tion. The soldier becomes a hybrid 
actor, whose technical components are 
increasingly modified to take on quali-
ties which are considered to be specifi-
cally human – such as behaviour 
which is specific to a situation and the 
ability to learn during "proactive act-
ing" (cf. Rammert/Schulz-Schaeffer 
2002). For example the visual percep-
tion of the soldier’s surroundings, or 
his own bodily condition, changes 
from an exclusively social action to an 
action that is both human and me-
chanical; and the two can then be re-
combined in a modular way. In this 
manner the network-centric logic, of 
decoupling sensors, decision-makers 
and shooters, is transferred to the mi-
crolevel of the action of the individual 
soldier. Thus for example during the 
act of shooting, a kind of transference 
of media takes place in the unity of 
eye, firing sight, target-location and 
firing. Targets can be marked by hav-
ing data sent in from the network. In 
this way it is possible for soldiers to 
take aim at a target which they merely 
see in virtual form. This also makes 
new shooting techniques possible: by 
using a video-sight, the eye can be 
lifted from the sight, the rifle moved 
out from cover and held above the 
head or pointed round a corner. The 
image from the video-sight is trans-
ferred to the head-mounted display, 
and so the target can be aimed at in 
this way. Supported by the network, 
new forms of combat interaction also 
become possible. Thus a soldier can 
request laser or GPS guided fire, by 
marking an objective with his laser. 
The soldier becomes the sensor for a 
shooter who does not have the target 
in his field of view (cf. NSD 2001, Panel 
2: 4). The expected gain in flexibility, 
speed and coordination which this 
combination of man and machine of-
fers, is immediately apparent. 
The characteristic feature here is the 
projective, future-oriented nature of 
the scenario. The equipment appears 
to offer endless possibilities. And thus 
new projects are constantly invented. 
Even though the Land Warrior has not 
yet come into production, work is al-
ready being done on his successor.7 
With the technological shaping of the 
soldier a utopian telos of governance 
has already been brought into play: the 
human being as infinitely adaptable 
Cyborg. Such a vision is derived from 
the field of space travel in the early 
60’s and the associated literary genre. 
According to the predictions, the hu-
man being will be able to survive in 
surroundings hostile to life, thanks to 
scientific progress (Spreen 1998: 7-12). 
Essentially Land Warrior is working on 
a technical heightening of the sensing-
power of the soldiers. In the case of 
Future Force Warrior, the protective 
suit is itself to become "intelligent" as 
well, to recognise the surroundings, 
and assist the movement of the sol-
diers by "exoskeletal strength". What 
once applied to outer space, now gets 
transcribed to become a military pro-
gramme in battlespace: the "subject" 
                                                       
7 Equipped with a budget of 6 billion dol-
lars, the original plan was to have about 
10,000 such systems ready for deployment 
by the year 2000. However, today there is 
still no production-ready version 1.0 of the 
"Land Warrior". The planned introduction 
met with repeated delays because of tech-
nical problems. A report by the Govern-
ment Accountability Office (GAO 2005: 91-
92) states that in January 2005 the personal 
network area system, which contains the 
switches, wiring and interfaces which are 
meant to connect up the elements worn on 
the body, was still not ready. And also the 
software-based Joint Tactical Radio Sys-
tem, which was to ensure that all the radio 
equipment used in the tactical area would 
be compatible, was still at the development 
stage. A further problem was the enormous 
weight of the total kit, which depending on 
the kind of full set of equipment ranged 
from 86 to 100 pounds (Wehrtechnischer 
Report 2003: 31-38). 
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becomes the technological "project" 
(Flusser 1994). 
4.2 Professional Skills: the Idea of the 
Multi-Skilled Warrior 
In this new configuration, bottom-up 
processes and self-organisation be-
come the central factor in military op-
erations, especially at the tactical level; 
the Internet design of knowledge and 
information structuring, is thus trans-
ferred to the military organisational 
structure, inspired by media tech-
niques. This is perceived as the only 
way to be in a position to deal with the 
dynamics and complexity of the new 
military tasks. But more than just 
equipping each soldier with new tech-
nical skills – "digital skills" being the 
appropriate term here (Schaab/ Dres-
sel/Moses 2004; Baxter 2004) – they 
are to be given a broader set of overall 
capacities and competencies. 
In harmony with this idea, the Army 
Research Institute for the Behavioral 
and Social Sciences (ARI) is working 
systematically to determine precise 
profiles of the new requirements, and 
is carefully examining the models for 
new forms of training. As a first stage, 
a research programme of the ARI is 
investigating how the new set of geo-
strategic tasks and the push for more 
technology affects the conditions of 
the soldiers’ training and service. It 
has identified six basic changes (HRRO 
2005: 2-4). The organisation is to be 
understood as a "learning environ-
ment" and no longer as an organisa-
tion with stable descriptions of official 
posts. It exhibits a "transformed Army 
culture", because "every soldier is 
trained and equipped to be a decision-
maker". It is characterised by new 
communications methods, involving 
an enormous frequency of communi-
cations. These three points are now 
added at the top of the list of military 
criteria and requirements, and only 
afterwards do we find listed the old 
factors, such as action under stress 
and in situations of endangerment to 
life, as characteristic features of mili-
tary operations. Thus, the research 
institute suggests, right at the recruit-
ing stage other "KSA’s" (Knowledge, 
Skills, and Attributes) have to be tested 
and promoted: the ability to adapt, the 
ability to communicate, and even cul-
tural tolerance, these are given priority 
now. The training objectives here de-
fine a new type of soldier – this in turn 
attracts a different type of recruit, one 
who is far more educated, for the mili-
tary. "Intelligence" is prescribed as the 
main precondition. 
The essential purpose of the training, 
as proposed by the ARI, is found in the 
concept of the "Multi-Skilled Soldier", 
an aim which is clearly set apart as 
different from traditional training 
methods (Nelsen/Akman 2002). Tradi-
tionally there have been very clearly 
demarcated and separate descriptions 
of the individual occupations: this is 
termed Military Occupational Special-
ity (MOS). There is a very precise ruling 
about which skills a person fitting a 
particular MOS must have. The pur-
pose of this system, which was intro-
duced at the start of the 20th century 
in the sense of Taylorist job descrip-
tions, is to enable a ready access to 
replacements. Should, say, a soldier of 
a mortar platoon, with job code MOS 
11C20, be effectively put out of action, 
then he is simply replaced by another 
MOS 11C20. Naturally in this system it 
would still be possible for the soldier 
to gain further qualifications. But what 
has changed now is that in every train-
ing programme from the start, other 
wide-ranging skills from other de-
partments are to be integrated. Both 
teamwork and independence are to be 
strengthened. The job boundaries are 
now seen as flexible, the jobs them-
selves in the midst of a flux. As a con-
sequence of this, continued training is 
now the duty of every soldier. What is 
more, a quality which was previously 
considered suspect for all but the 
command levels, is now to be a stan-
dard requirement for every soldier: the 
creative problem-solving ability: "The 
focus of the training would be to instill 
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in the soldier the mindset of adaptabil-
ity, self-education, and problem solv-
ing as defining attributes." (ibid: 6) 
Adaptability, self-education, problem 
solving are viewed as necessary skills 
for every soldier at the crest of military 
missions in the information age: "In 
one moment in time, our service 
members will be feeding and clothing 
displaced refugees – providing hu-
manitarian assistance. In the next 
moment, they will be holding two war-
ring tribes apart – conducting peace-
keeping operations. Finally, they will 
be fighting a highly lethal mid-
intensity battle. All on the same day, all 
within three blocks. It will be what we 
call the three block war." (Gen. Charles 
Krulak, cited in Alberts/Hayes 2003: 66) 
Krulak’s oft-quoted idea of the "Three 
Block War" reflects the new situation 
in political security, the new percep-
tion of threat, here viewed from the 
perspective of tactical missions. The 
broadening of what one considers to 
be the military field of deployment 
becomes the basis for making new 
demands on the soldiers’ abilities and 
performance. It is the ready canvas, on 
which the image of the soldiers’ quali-
ties and skills is drawn. The situation 
may call for an instant transition from 
negotiating good relations between 
national groups, to fighting the enemy. 
It affects both the inner attitude, and 
also the skills needed in, say, switch-
ing a display from foreign language 
assistance to enemy situation picture. 
In such situations, the command and 
obedience structures ingrained by 
practice, the specialisations and me-
chanical routines – the kind of disci-
pline which Max Weber had in mind 
when he spoke of the "iron cage of 
obedience" – can no longer suffice to 
ensure an adequate service. The sol-
dier has to adapt himself to a regime 
of fluid transformation and change: 
"The multifunctional warrior is now 
trained to think not what to think. At 
one time, the warrior was trained only 
for certain missions. We are now 
breaking down this linear environ-
ment. Task organization is becoming 
increasingly fluid." (NSD, 2001, panel 
1: 7) 
This fluid, transformatory regime, 
which the sociological diagnosis iden-
tifies as the central characteristic of 
the information age (cf. Castells 1996, 
Lash 2002), is now dictating the mili-
tary plan of operations – it guides the 
profiling of the new soldier. While be-
fore the emphasis was laid on obedi-
ence, one now speaks of "empower-
ment". Network-centric warfare "in-
volves the empowerment of individuals 
at the edge of an organization" (Al-
berts/Hayes 2003: 5). And Land Warrior 
is considered to be one of the decisive 
instruments for flattening the hierar-
chy and shifting the power of the or-
ganisation downwards (Adams 2000: 
55). The spirit of a general is to be 
planted in every private. Thus Krulak 
(1999) could describe the new key fig-
ure emerging from this fluid regime, as 
the "strategic corporal". 
4.3 Professional Culture: the Ethos of 
the "Land Warrior" 
The protagonists of network-centric 
warfare orient themselves to the com-
munal visions of Internet culture, they 
relate network culture to a culture of 
the collectivity. As a result, the key 
problem which every social network 
organisation has to face now becomes 
crucial: if self-organisation tends to 
replace the hierarchy, then trust be-
comes the central resource for co-
operation (cf. Weyer 2000: 11-14). The 
Joint Vision 2020 speaks of a spirit of 
"jointness", which is to hold the armed 
forces together, from the small group 
up to the highest levels transcending 
the separate armed forces, from sol-
dier to leader. The theorists of net-
work-centric warfare go on to assert 
that "interoperability" also holds sway 
in a "cognitive" and "social domain" 
(Alberts/Hayes 2003: 107-114); that 
means it would be based on deep 
emotional and normative ties. Net-
work-centric warfare calls for a search 
for stronger forms of cohesion. And 
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here the answer to the problem of 
building trust can indeed be found in 
the traditional military way of 
strengthening self-definition: the com-
mon ethos of the soldier. Not only 
should the qualities and skills of the 
soldier be developed, it is the ethical 
shaping of the soldier which becomes 
a central project of a future-oriented 
transformation process. 
Considering effective ways to collect 
together all the "efforts on winning the 
Global War on Terrorism", the U.S. 
Army (2004: 15) named 16 concrete 
initiatives which were to be given pri-
ority. One of them was: "The soldier – 
develop flexible, adaptive and compe-
tent soldiers with a warrior ethos." 
Such a warrior ethos has been devel-
oped by a task force specially set up 
for this in the army’s programme of 
transformation. The result is tanta-
mount to a confession of faith: "A war-
rior’s ethos. I am an American soldier. 
I will always place the mission first. I 
will never accept defeat. I will never 
quit. I will never leave a fallen com-
rade. I am an American Soldier. I live 
by this creed."8 This ethos, which is 
firmly integrated at every step of train-
ing, is aimed not only at guiding the 
soldier’s behaviour, it is intended pri-
marily to promote a collective identity. 
To the question "What do you do for a 
living?", the soldier should no longer 
reply: radio-operator, cook or electri-
cal engineer in the army, or suchlike, 
but: "I’m a warrior" (Burlas 2004). Be-
sides this initiative, a plethora of dis-
cussions and programmes have arisen 
as to how this spirit of jointness is to 
be developed. Suggestions such as 
these emerge: to survey the "command 
climate", in order to assess the ability 
of officers to create trust (Jones 2003); 
to base the promotion system more 
firmly on the organisational unity 
rather than on individual careers 
(Smith/Corbin/Hellman 2001: 106-110); 
                                                       
8 This "Soldier’s Creed" in the concise ver-
sion cited here can also be found as a vid-
eoclip (www.army.mil/warriorethos/). 
to experiment with an extension and 
prolonging of the basic training in or-
der to strengthen the collective identity 
(Nelson/Akman 2002: 12). 
This leads conceptually to a twofold 
contradiction in the constitution of the 
"postmodern" military, as the military 
sociologists have observed, which is 
bound to emerge in network-centric 
warfare. The first point is the contra-
diction between the attributes of a 
"warrior" and a "peacemaker", which 
for example finds expression in the 
dichotomy of "to be fit for action" vs. 
"empathy", of "decisiveness" vs. "exper-
tise", of "obedience" vs. "co-
operativeness" (Nuciari 2003: 75). And 
secondly, the contradiction between 
an organisation which, oriented to 
social and yet no less to technological 
qualification profiles, compares and 
equates the professional image of the 
soldier to that of other commercial 
activities, and yet attempts to distin-
guish an ethos specific to the profes-
sion, the state of being a soldier, from 
all other activities (ibid: 76-80). Both 
are to be strengthened at the same 
time: the warrior and the peacemaker, 
the obedient soldier and the independ-
ently responsible expert. Network-
centric warfare makes of contradictory 
demands a feature of its programme. 
The new soldier is meant to be both 
peacemaker and warrior, he is to be 
capable of acting in an independently 
responsible, creative and adaptable 
way, while yet remaining ever obedient 
to orders, subject to the military col-
lectivity and duty-bound to service of 
the nation. 
When we look at the way these con-
tradictions come into play, we find that 
there is an aligning of the network-
centric military organisation to match 
the new opponents of the information 
age undermining the sovereignty of the 
modern state – from subversive politi-
cal networks, up to new forms of or-
ganized crime and terrorists groups. 
For these too – according to the analy-
sis of Arquilla/Ronfeldt (2001: 328-343) 
– replace organisational rigidity by a 
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greatly increased density of communi-
cations, which is achieved by a me-
thodical use of new information and 
communications technologies, and by 
encouraging a communal approach 
with the use of narrations, values and 
doctrines. The term network was al-
ways associated by the national force-
organisation with a kind of terror be-
cause networks are by nature organi-
sations at the boundary of formal ad-
hesion, at the edge of dissolution. It is 
not unusual for combatants to run off 
when they see things getting too risky. 
And networks are also seen as a terror 
because they operate constantly on the 
verge of transgressing rules. Indeed 
the network was ever the metaphor for 
the criminal, the underground, the 
radical. And it is precisely in this two-
fold manner of operating at the edge, 
that lies the radical nature and am-
bivalence of this endeavour to break 
through the bounds of the iron cage in 
which Weber saw the people of the 
modern era confined, by the mobilisa-
tion of the power of the Land Warrior 
(cf. Kaufmann 2005: 247-250). 
4.4 The Soldier on the Screen: the 
Network as Control Room 
Besides ethos and doctrine, network-
centric warfare does of course hold 
one special medium for securing trust: 
the military Internet itself, this "Com-
mon Operational Picture" (COP). In 
these techniques of subject-forming, 
characteristic forms of visibility are set 
up, one establishes effective control 
instances for maintaining and using 
visibility. And in this very control space 
we find a further utopian aspect of the 
network-form of governance, ex-
pressed here in military terms.9 
The essential element, around which 
the whole networked form of opera-
tion revolves, is the COP: "Shared bat-
                                                       
9 Regarding the social dispersion of net-
work-formed governance, see the outline 
by Kaufmann (2004). For the comparison to 
the supervisory technique of 360°-evalua-
tion, which functions in a very similar way 
to the COP, see Bröckling (2003). 
tlespace awareness emerges when all 
relevant elements of the warfighting 
ecosystem are provided with access to 
the COP. This means that battlespace 
awareness must be viewed as a collec-
tive property (a type of collective con-
sciousness)." (Alberts/Garstka/Stein 
1999: 135) The network-based military 
operates with a "collective conscious-
ness", in the form of media-
technology. The link-up to the COP 
widens the perception. The individual 
infantryman still knows the situation 
of friend and foe, he has sensor-data 
available to him, he is in e-mail-
contact with soldiers of neighbouring 
units and can call up assistance for his 
particular action over the network. But 
at the same time each individual sol-
dier is given a "data-double". The in-
fantryman will be constantly online, 
his movements will be registered and 
fed into the situation picture. He will 
have this picture presented to his own 
view on a head-up display, the whole 
time. Thus the soldier acts as his own 
observer, watching his actions as they 
are represented on the screen. The 
soldiers can become virtual command-
ers of themselves, because using the 
screen they are able to relate their own 
situation to the overall situation – and 
that means self-synchronisation. And 
they act always under the observation 
of the others for whom the same ap-
plies. The network becomes a general-
ised control space. The collective con-
sciousness, which Durkheim has so 
effectively shown to be widely distrib-
uted and deeply anchored in many of 
the regulations, norms and instances 
of society, would here be represented 
by a kind of running media installa-
tion. 
What the COP would mean here, is not 
so much a control by monitoring the 
execution of a plan, rather what hap-
pens is that the whole sequence of 
command and control – that means 
planning, reconnaissance, orientation, 
decision, command, surveillance – 
converges in one simultaneous proc-
ess. The optimum in governance is 
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attained if the constant self-adaptation 
to the changing situation pictures can 
be kept up. "Leadership" no longer 
figures as a quality which is allocated 
to one person or one position, but as 
an emergent phenomenon that devel-
ops out of the situation (Albert/Hayes 
2003: 184-186). 
This telos of governance, where there 
is a constant optimisation and fine 
adjustment of one’s own forces, does 
contain utopian factors for its opera-
tion.10 Gorman’s saying, "the network 
will enable you to see all that can be 
seen", relates to ideas of a "transparent 
battlefield", and many have imagined a 
"God’s-eye view" circulating in the 
network. And this is exactly where one 
finds the technological utopia: God’s 
insight is immediate, whereas soldiers 
have to rely on media, on data. Again, 
it is just at this point where the whole 
apparatus of information and commu-
nications technology, from the GIG to 
the display of the Land Warrior, comes 
into play, the whole process by which 
the reality is brought quite literally "in-
formation", via media, via the readings 
which are worked on by "digital skills". 
To imagine that this whole machinery 
steps into a kind of pure media-space, 
because it runs friction-free, is uto-
pian. This idea hides, for example, the 
dialectic that when one transfers the 
war almost entirely into another 
sphere, that of information, this leads 
to counter-movements.11 And it hides 
                                                       
10 It is precisely here where its strength lies: 
for example, although the implementation 
of Land Warrior has been delayed for years, 
the project is constantly being revised but 
never given up. And again the negative 
events experienced in the Iraq war – for 
example that strong forces of the Iraqi 
army were "overlooked" despite a superior 
surveillance, or that during the fast-moving 
mobile warfare in the first phase, it was not 
possible to set up information networks 
with corresponding swiftness – all this 
could be brushed aside while focussing on 
the future development to come. (cf. Scully 
2004; Onley 2004; Grant 2005). 
11 One knows for example that NATO, rely-
ing on their high-tech reconnaissance in 
the Kosovo war, dropped some 3,000 pre-
the "frictions" – to use this Clause-
witzian term – in one’s own gear-
wheels, which follow on from internal 
increases in complexity; for example 
when everyone is able to decide about 
targets.12 Viewed in this light, one 
might conclude that network-centric 
warfare is a project of the type de-
scribed by Daniel Defoe at the end of 
the 17th century: part of a phase of 
enthusiastic project-building, which 
takes it original model from the tower 
of Babel (cf. Klopotek 2004: 218-219). 
But of course this utopian undercur-
rent is linked to project-forms in the 
sense of contemporary management, 
which works with concrete objectives, 
with definite time-periods, with 
evaluations for individual intentions. 
The phase of enthusiastic project-
building is the driving force behind 
efforts to realise network-centric pro-
jects. The expectations for such tech-
nological and social developments are 
relatively impervious to problems, set-
backs, and the failure of individual 
projects, quite simply because they 
relate to nothing less than the thresh-
old of a new era. 
 
                                                                  
cision bombs. They struck 550 targets: 50 
tanks – and 500 decoys (Sloan 2002: 94-
95). Camouflage and simulation is only a 
means of counteraction, and indeed the 
internal military critics never tire in point-
ing out the sensitivity of information tech-
nologies towards counterattacks (among 
many others: Mey/Krüger 2005: 32-33, 36). 
12 The army officer Robert Leonhard (2000: 
156-157, 224-225) reports that during 
large-scale experiments with information-
based operations, the use of munitions 
caused "logistical nightmares". Instead of 
fighting important targets in a focussed 
way – and thereby sparing munition as 
planned, – everything that the improved 
surveillance identified as a potential target 
was immediately fired at. Hence there is a 
constant discussion about the problem of 
"information flooding" on all levels, and 
linked with this, whether one can raise the 
standard of training accordingly, specially 
at the lower level (cf. among many others 
Mey/Krüger 2005: 34). 
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5 Conclusion 
The military sociology, like the military 
programmatic theorists themselves, 
has for some time now been suggest-
ing that a comprehensive transforma-
tion of the military field is currently in 
progress. A discourse analysis of the 
programmatic itself, such as the one 
being carried out here, reveals that in 
its central formulations it is founded 
on expectations, which have hardly 
been acknowledged by the military 
sociological analysis: primarily, the 
expectation of a radical technical 
change. 
It was possible to take a three-tiered 
approach in describing this central role 
of the expectation of a technical 
change: there is the strategic-technical 
transformation which is inspired by 
the key-word "Information Age"; then 
the technical, organisational and op-
erative transformation by applying the 
idea of network-centric warfare, which 
is clearly realized as and decidedly 
presented as a coevolutive project; 
while at the level of soldierly discipline 
the transformation crystallises out as 
the Land Warrior project. 
In order to understand the mobilising 
force, the dynamics and range which 
the programmatic is developing on 
these three levels, we refer to two dis-
tinct research viewpoints with the 
theorems implicit in them. The idea of 
"prospective structures" gave some 
impression of the tremendous mobilis-
ing energy which the talk of a transi-
tion to the information age evokes in 
the military context. The term is linked 
to technocratic visions of monitoring 
and control, and suggests that in fu-
ture the superior weapons systems will 
result from the technology of com-
mand and control and no longer from 
superior weapons platforms. 
The idea of "prospective structures" 
draws on the actor-network theory, 
whose basic assumption is that techni-
cal change should always be expressed 
in sociotechnical terms, and against 
this background one can discover the 
logic linking together the key elements 
of the planned technical and social 
change of the military. The program-
matic of a network-centric warfare can 
be read as a kind of applied actor-
network theory, where a military 
Internet becomes the catalyst for a 
reconfiguration of the entire organisa-
tional fabric. And this leads to a new 
orientation for the organisational 
structure, the operational procedures, 
the information management and in-
formation culture. Here the network 
serves as the pivotal idea, guarantee-
ing the homologous alignment of the 
technical procedures and social roles, 
tasks and attitudes. The fact that the 
idea functions here more as a meta-
phor than a clearly defined concept, is 
precisely what lends it such power: it 
allows heterogeneous factors, those of 
decentralised, modular, flexible meth-
ods of co-ordination in the economic 
field, to be combined with tactical 
methods of battle and the communi-
tary approaches of an alternative 
Internet culture. Interconnectivity and 
interoperability become key features, 
applying in equal measure to technical 
systems, sociotechnical units of action, 
the units of organisation, and also to 
individuals. Furthermore the idea of 
network-centric warfare, in both its 
technical and its social components, is 
viewed as providing the answer to the 
various geostrategic and tactical chal-
lenges which the "Information Age" 
presents. 
This is most evident in the sociotech-
nical reconfiguration of the soldier, as 
envisaged by Land Warrior. By refer-
ring back to Foucault’s theory of sub-
jectivation, which is taken up in cur-
rent governmentality studies, we 
gained a viewpoint allowing a system-
atic approach to the change in the 
shaping of the soldier within this 
frame of a network-centric warfare. 
Firstly the soldier, and especially his 
senses, will be newly constituted as a 
sociotechnical hybrid. Secondly, it is 
not only the network of technical and 
human activities now being built onto 
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the body which imposes new demands 
on the capacities and skills of the sol-
dier. It is rather the overall functioning 
of a flexible and network-based or-
ganisation which makes up the ration-
ality of the concept of the "multiskilled 
warrior", who is primarily designed for 
adaptability, self-education and prob-
lem-solving. Thirdly, the question of 
how to compensate for the loss of 
formal cohesion which characterises a 
network is answered by a strengthen-
ing of fundamental ethics. And the 
method for this involves learning from 
the new network-organised challeng-
ers with an almost mirror-like emula-
tion. Fourthly, and this is the second 
answer to the loosening of formal co-
hesion, one feature of the Common 
Operational Picture is that a new form 
of control emerges, which no longer 
follows the old pattern of top-down 
control – the aim now is rather to se-
cure a constant adaptation to the 
situation by means of a generalised 
self-control. 
Thus we find that the reference to 
Foucault’s idea, that one should iden-
tify the traces of power in the constitu-
tion of the subject, gains a double sig-
nificance. It not only allowed a sys-
tematic analysis, at the level of sub-
ject-formation, of the perspective of-
fered by actor-network theory, trying 
to find the conditions, mechanisms 
and contents of networks where the 
technical action potential and social 
action potential become compatible. It 
also demonstrates in an exemplary 
way just how much the network co-
ordination form, with its independently 
acting, independently deciding, flexible 
subject, is the result of a power-based 
subjectivisation process. This is not a 
new discovery, but it does lend itself to 
a specially meaningful use in this mili-
tary context. 
As we have repeatedly stressed: here 
the main focus of interest has not been 
the theoretical or methodological as-
pects, but an examination of the basic 
sociotechnical orientation of the pro-
grammatic theorists, working to re-
configure the method of warfare, the 
military apparatus and above all the 
soldier, as a network-formation. It is 
well-known, for example from studies 
of organisation sociology, that there 
often lies a broad rift between such 
programmatic and the actual forms of 
operation and leadership. And not only 
where the internal structure is con-
cerned: the question also arises 
whether it is really feasible to deal with 
terrorist networks and a partisan-type 
warfare with forces armed in this 
manner. On this point we merely indi-
cated certain contradictory elements 
and the general utopian nature of the 
project. 
But one should take the programmatic 
seriously. It ought to give sociologists 
pause for thought, when the very insti-
tution which, at the beginning of the 
modern era, had for many social theo-
rists represented the model example of 
the new organisational and social type, 
and which is still now most strongly 
associated with a hierarchical struc-
ture, should now be found to be 
adopting quite a different organisa-
tional and disciplinary mode for its 
fundamental orientation. And not only 
this: until now it has hardly been con-
sidered in sociology how the entire 
field of national security is undergoing 
an extensive restructuring under the 
new head of "networking" (cf. Kauf-
mann 2006). In view of such consid-
erations, the diagnosis of the "Rise of 
the Network Society" can be granted 
further plausibility. 
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Abstract 
Communications about the future potentials of current innovation processes of 
nanotechnology are often accompanied by visionary scenarios anticipating future 
applications of nanotechnological products. The analysis and evaluation of the 
mediality of such scenarios has for some time been an important research topic of 
both sociological expectation- and Leitbild-research as well as, more recently, the 
vision assessment of German technology assessment. However, problems arise in 
these research traditions when they analyze and evaluate the mediality of highly-
futuristic visions whose speculative contents correspond neither to current trends 
in nanotechnological research and product development nor clearly to strategies 
and interests of the actors of innovation processes. Based on a case study on the 
mediality of visionary images of nanomachines used in medical journals, popular 
science magazines, business press and daily and weekly newspapers, my article 
shows that highly-futuristic scenarios can by all means be analyzed and evaluated 
as means of communication which facilitate communication between scientific, 
economic and mass medial discourses about future potentials of nanotechnology. 
The use of these futuristic and visionary scenarios for communicating nanotech-
nology’s futures influences discourse-specific assessments of the innovative poten-
tials of current nanotechnological product developments. To enable an analysis 
and evaluation of the mediality of highly-speculative visions which are not directly 
related to practical affairs, my article extends the theoretical and methodological 
instrument of the current vision assessment program. I suggest a systems-theore-
tical reorientation of vision assessment which is currently dominated by actor 
theoretical models. 
                                                       
1 Financial support for this work was provided by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft. I 
would like to thank the editors and the two anonymous referees for their useful comments. I 
thank Sabine Maasen for her suggestions on a Luhmannian interpretation of the presented 
research results. 
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1 Introduction 
Nanotechnology is a highly visionary 
topic. The most significant nanotech-
nological developments are expected 
to occur in the coming decades. Sce-
narios anticipating future applications 
of nanotechnological products—e.g. 
innovative drug delivery systems in 
medicine or smart devices designed for 
the mobile lifestyle—are communi-
cated at the interfaces between poli-
tics, science, economy and the mass 
media.2 As sociological research on 
future expectations (e.g. Brown/Mikael 
2003; Rip 2005; van Lente 1993), tech-
nological ‘Leitbilder,’ or guiding vi-
sions (Mambrey/Tepper 2000, Dierkes 
et al. 1996; Wyatt 2000), and the vision 
assessment of German technology 
assessment of nanotechnology (Grun-
wald 2004; Coenen 2004; Paschen et 
al. 2004) have shown, the visions are 
suitable as means of communication in 
innovation processes. The relevant 
actors use these means of communica-
tion not only to discuss the perceived 
goals, developments and uses of 
nanotechnology, but also to consider 
the opportunities and risks posed by 
                                                       
2 Nanotechnological visions are themati-
cally quite versatile, since nanotechnology 
is situated at the crossroads between es-
tablished technologies such as material 
sciences, bioengineering, information, and 
communication technologies. Due to its 
multi-disciplinary nature, nanotechnology 
is expected to lead to continual improve-
ments (incremental innovations) in the 
various branches via new convergences 
between the individual scientific and tech-
nological disciplines and branches. At the 
same time, such convergences between, for 
example, nanotechnology, micro technol-
ogy, biotechnology, and information tech-
nology are expected to make completely 
new products (radical innovations) possi-
ble. The source material on future expecta-
tions of nanotechnology as a converging 
technology is rich and diverse; cf. the fol-
lowing two reports by interdisciplinary 
expert groups Roco/Bainbridge (2002); 
European Commission (2004). For more on 
Science & Technology Studies (STS) on the 
visions of nanotechnology, see e.g Selin 
2002; Fogelberg/Glimell 2003; Nordmann 
2004; Schummer 2004; Hessenbruch 2004; 
Milburn 2004. 
such developments. Problems arise, 
however, when the mentioned studies 
try to analyze and evaluate the medial-
ity of widely distributed and futuristic 
visions—e.g. visions of surgical nano-
robots and mini-submarines in the 
human body—whose feasibility is not 
suggested by current scientific-
technological research and develop-
ment and contradicts the interests of 
most scientific and economic actors. 
Scenarios depicting speculative and 
futuristic visions are often used out-
side of concrete agendas—e.g. agen-
das of research policy or corporate 
product development—in the narrow 
sense. Articles from a broad range of 
publication-domains—popular science 
magazines, daily and weekly newspa-
pers, the business press and even sci-
entific journals—use such visionary 
scenarios for the representation of 
future potentials of current nanotech-
nological research and development—
for instance, the designing of novel 
nanoparticles for drug carriers. When 
one interprets the scenarios’ contents 
literally, the futuristic visions of nano-
robots and mini-submarines have vir-
tually nothing to do with actual inno-
vation processes in nanomedicine. 
These visions seem rather to take on 
metaphorical or imaginative mediating 
functions in communication processes 
which—as my article will show—
cannot be adequately explained with 
the actor-theoretical models which are 
used most frequently by sociology of 
expectations and Leitbild research. 
Paradoxically, this also applies to the 
new German vision assessment of 
nanotechnology. In contrast to Leitbild 
research, vision assessment’s pro-
grammatic goal is to be applicable for 
the analysis, evaluation and manage-
ment of the use of explicitly “futuristic 
visions” (Grunwald 2004: 1-6). 
Due to their actor-theoretical orienta-
tion, these studies are interested in 
which actors make use of certain vi-
sions in certain contexts as media for 
communicating futures in order to 
influence current innovation proc-
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esses. Specifically, the actors’ inten-
tions, strategies, and goals are taken 
into consideration. From the analytical 
perspective of these studies, the corre-
lation between the visionary topics of 
future scenarios and current develop-
ments, strategies, and interests in cer-
tain areas of science, economy, re-
search policy, or even in the mass me-
dia are a main criterion for the evalua-
tion of the visions’ medial effective-
ness. The actor-theoretical orientation 
thereby shapes the analytical categori-
zation of the visions. If a correlation 
between visionary descriptions of the 
future and current reality cannot be 
reconstructed, from this perspective—
as I will explain using the example of 
the German vision assessment of 
nanotechnology—the mediality of vi-
sions cannot be adequately analyzed 
and evaluated. Speculative-futuristic 
visions, insofar as they are said to play 
a role in communication processes at 
all, are assessed as being ‘merely’ rhe-
torical stylistic tools of the mass me-
dia: On the one hand, they can awaken 
the interest of the viewers; on the 
other hand, they can mislead the view-
ers’ understanding of the future poten-
tials of nanotechnology (i.e. Selin 
2002: 15; Paschen et al. 2004: 268). 
According to my research, such 
evaluations do not explain the specific 
mediality of futuristic visions. My hy-
pothesis claims that speculative and 
futuristic visions can function as 
means of communication due to their 
weak, or better: ‘vague’ and ‘unclear,’ 
references to current nanotechnologi-
cal research and product development. 
Such visions offer ‘structural inter-
faces’ (in Luhmann’s sense) which 
enable e.g. scientific, economic and 
mass medial discourses specific and—
due to the discourses’ different modes 
for processing meaning—also contrary 
interpretations of their contents. The 
visions function as media, stimulating 
communications which are based on 
the discourses’ internal processing of 
the disconcerting interpretations of 
other discourses.3 
A vision assessment which is oriented 
towards a systems-theoretical inter-
pretation of the mediality of future 
descriptions would not examine future 
scenarios of nanotechnology to deter-
mine which actors’ intentions and 
goals the scenarios’ contents are re-
lated to in a ‘literal’ sense. Such an 
assessment would analyse how, within 
which framework (for example in 
which discursive formations), and on 
the basis of which forms (for example 
discourse-specific references to vision-
ary topics) certain scenarios function 
                                                       
3 This hypothesis is oriented towards Nik-
las Luhmann’s interpretation of the func-
tion of descriptions of the future in current 
and future-related negotiation processes 
(e.g. Luhmann 1992a; see also Luhmann 
1982). Luhmann uses the concept of media 
in his writings in various forms. In my 
study, I apply a media-concept based on 
his definition of ‘media’ and the differentia-
tion between ‘media’ and ‘form’ in Die 
Kunst der Gesellschaft (The Art of Society; 
c.f. Luhmann 1995a: 165-214). The sys-
tems-theoretical conception of communi-
cation corresponds to a specific character-
istic of the discourses, namely the differ-
ence of discourse-perspectives. Although 
discourses do not intervene in each other 
during communication, they can specifi-
cally incite one another to come to deci-
sions which influence actions (compare i.e. 
Luhmann 1992b). Based on the actor-
theory concept of ‘boundary objects’ in 
Star and Griesemer’s further development 
of the ‘Sociology of Translations,’ such 
future visions constitute ‘communicative 
spaces’ which enable the circulation and 
transfer of different meanings and interests 
between previously unconnected actors 
and networks (see Star/Griesemer 1999; 
Callon et al. 1986). Viewed from the con-
cept of ‘communicative difference’ (e.g. 
Nassehi 2003) in the systems theory, these 
‘communicative spaces’ do not allow the 
transfer of knowledge between discourses, 
but rather communication which is based 
on discourse-specific processings of dis-
concerting information. For a discussion 
on the communication models of informa-
tion transfer between contexts versus con-
text-specific processings of disconcerting 
information in studies on science and tech-
nology communication, cf. for example 
Japp 1997; Bucchi 2004. 
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as means for communicating future 
potentials of current nanotechnologi-
cal research and development.4 
Based on the results of a case study on 
visionary images of nanomachines in 
communication processes between 
scientific, economic, and mass medial 
discourses, the aim of my article is to 
examine the ‘additional value’ of a 
combined systems-theoretical and dis-
course-analytical approach for an as-
sessment of the mediality of highly-
futuristic visions. Following this intro-
ductory chapter is a short presentation 
of the interpretation of visions as 
means of communication and strategic 
instruments in actor-theory oriented 
studies on expectations and guiding 
visions (Leitbilder) in innovation proc-
esses (Chapter 2). The new German 
program of vision assessment and its 
preliminary empirical results in tech-
nology assessment on nanotechnology 
serve in my study as an exemplary 
point of departure. At this point, it will 
become clear that categorizing the 
visions analytically according to their 
chronological periodization and ‘epis-
temic status’ (truth-factor, feasibility) 
leads to fundamental problems for the 
evaluation of the mediality of futuristic 
visions as well as for the development 
of normative recommendations for the 
management of the use of these vi-
sions (Chapters 3 and 4). Starting with 
two exemplary nanotechnological fu-
ture scenarios, I explain the relevance 
of a theoretical-methodological exten-
sion of the current vision assessment 
program (Chapter 5). Using the case 
study on the mediality of visionary 
                                                       
4 The functionality of this combination of a 
formation analytical discourse theory—
oriented towards Michel Foucault’s dis-
course concept (Foucault 1972)—and a 
systems theoretical interpretation of com-
munication processes is explained empiri-
cally in Chapter 6.2 of this article. For stud-
ies on key terms, metaphors and images as 
mediators between discourses which are 
based on similar theoretical and methodo-
logical approaches, compare, for example 
Leyesdorff/Hellsten 2005; Maasen/Weingart 
2000. 
images of nanomachines, I introduce 
my approach of an analysis and 
evaluation of the mediality of visions 
(Chapter 6). Finally, I point out the 
implications of the systems-theoretical 
interpretation of the communicative 
function of descriptions of the future 
for an extension and modification of 
the vision assessment program (Chap-
ter 7). 
 
2 Visions as Media and Strategies 
Sociological research on the dynamics 
of future expectations in innovation 
processes have examined the medial 
effects of expectations within devel-
opment agendas or in the complex 
processes of socio-technological im-
plementation in case studies on other 
future technologies—for example in-
formation technology and genetic en-
gineering (e.g. Konrad 2004; Brown et 
al. 2000). Such studies on the perfor-
mativity of expectations were able to 
reconstructively provide information 
about the effects of visions on innova-
tion processes—for example, hopes 
and fears about genetic engineering—
which can be made useful for the 
technology assessment of nanotech-
nology (e.g. Brown 2003; Michael 
2000; Rip 2005; Meyer/Kuushi 2004). 
Comparable to these studies, German 
technology assessment, which is ori-
ented towards technical-sociological 
Leitbild-research, has started to attach 
great importance to the analysis and 
evaluation of nanotechnological vi-
sions, as they are considered to have a 
significant impact on nanoscientific 
and nanotechnological development 
strategies and to influence the imple-
mentation of nanotechnology in soci-
ety (e.g. Paschen et al. 2004). 
The medial role of guiding visions 
(Leitbilder) as constitutive for the so-
cietal implementation of new tech-
nologies has been investigated by Leit-
bild-research for some time now. It is 
the programmatic intention to place 
emphasis on the necessity of research-
ing Leitbilder and visions, since visions 
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and Leitbilder are considered effective 
means of designing and evaluating 
technology (e.g. Mambrey et al. 1995: 
16, Dierkes et al. 1996). In this context, 
the terms ‘Leitbild’ and ‘visions’ are 
used synonymously for the most part 
and are to be read in a pragmatized 
sense, namely “in the sense of general 
and future-oriented conceptions of 
desirable and attainable lines of tech-
nical development or normative devel-
opment goals” (Dierkes et al. 1996: 
23). Here, the term ‘vision’ is limited to 
the description of that which is not yet 
reality but should or could be realized 
in the future. This notion of ‘vision,’ 
often underlying political rhetoric or 
business programs, semantically re-
sembles terms such as ‘plan,’ ‘notion,’ 
or ‘intention’ (Schnettler 2004: 212-
213). Thus, it is hardly separable from 
intentional distribution and implemen-
tation strategies of agents acting as 
‘visionaries.’5 
The analytical perspective of these 
studies is based on actor-theory. Vi-
sions are viewed as means used by 
certain actors as strategic instruments 
for the implementation of their inter-
ests. According to Leitbild research, 
Leitbilder and visions should have im-
portant formative effects precisely in 
the early stages of technological de-
velopment and innovation processes 
(e.g. Mambrey et al. 1995: 20). In the 
examination of the mediality of vi-
sions, some approaches of Leitbild-
research are—in addition to their ac-
tor-theoretical perspective—oriented 
towards systems-theoretical interpre-
tations of the functionality of commu-
nication media. They view Leitbilder 
and visions as media that enable 
“structural interfaces” (in Luhmann’s 
                                                       
5 According to Schnettler, this secularized 
notion of ‘vision’ is most wide-spread in 
everyday life today. In contrast to religious 
visions, visions today distinguish them-
selves through their intentional production, 
communicative distribution and reference 
to implementation (Schnettler 2004: 212-
215). These visions do not refer to ideals; 
they attempt to describe possibilities. 
sense) between functional systems of 
society. Leitbilder are thereby said to 
function as mediators in and between 
the various systems (ibid.: 47). Based 
on this reference to systems-theory, 
such studies conclude that for the ex-
planation of the mediality of Leitbilder, 
not the “truths” of the visions, but 
rather their “simple effectiveness” 
(ibid.: 31) is of importance. However, 
the simultaneous actor-theoretical 
interpretation of Leitbilder and visions 
as strategic instruments of actors cre-
ates problems for the analysis and 
evaluation of speculative and futuristic 
visions which are not directly related 
to practical affairs. These visions can-
not necessarily be interpreted as stra-
tegically utilizable instruments in 
communication processes; however, 
they seem to function in another form 
as means of communication. 
 
3 The Program of Vision Assess-
ment 
The demand for a specific vision as-
sessment in technology assessment 
is—according to the connotations of 
‘visions’ as planning instruments and 
distribution strategies—based on the 
concept that visions, by reason of their 
being a means of strategy, can influ-
ence processes of development and 
the socio-technological implementa-
tion of innovations. Likewise, by rea-
son of their being a means of commu-
nication, they can form a common 
platform of understanding among the 
actors participating in the development 
and application of new technologies. 
Thus it is understandable why the re-
search perspective of “vision assess-
ment”—including the investigation of 
futuristic visions—is considered im-
portant for the technology assessment 
of future technologies (Grunwald 2004; 
Grin/Grunwald 2000): in its function as 
a prospective tool, the examination of 
visions and the observation of the ac-
ceptance of particular visions should 
make it possible for technology as-
sessment to assess future possibilities 
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and risks posed by a new technology. 
It might thus be possible to prepare 
oneself in advance for new regulatory 
demands. With regard to its formative 
intentions, technology assessment 
could use visions as means of commu-
nication between the various actors—
the engineers and technical experts, 
the investors, and the public—involved 
in the development and utilization of 
new technologies in order to support 
and encourage the desired innovative 
processes by means of the mediating 
dialogue between these actors.6 
In his talk on Vision Assessment as a 
New Element of the Technology Futures 
Analysis Toolbox, Armin Grunwald of 
the Institute for Technology Assess-
ment and Systems Analysis (ITAS) in 
Karlsruhe emphasizes a renewed rele-
vance of investigating visions in the 
field of technology assessment which 
has become particularly evident in the 
debates surrounding nanotechnology 
(Grunwald 2004). Following Grunwald, 
“futuristic visions,” which today domi-
nate public media debates, are pro-
duced and distributed in committees 
and workshops led by research-policy 
and investment experts, especially in 
US research-policy (ibid.: 1-2).7 Ac-
cording to Grunwald, vision assess-
ment dealing especially with futuristic 
visions therefore requires that previ-
ous approaches of Leitbild-research be 
extended analytically and methodol-
ogically (ibid.: 9). 
In order to achieve this requirement, 
Grunwald has developed a program 
which provides the following proce-
dural steps: the first step is a “vision 
analysis” involving a mapped categori-
zation of the occurring visions. The 
second step is a “vision evaluation,” 
                                                       
6 For more on the differentiation between 
prospective and formative functions of 
technology assessments, cf. the overview 
by Grunwald 2002. 
7 Grunwald refers to convergences between 
the visions of US research policy and those 
of the Bill Joy debates in the mass media. 
See e.g. NSTC 1999; Roco/Bainbridge 2002; 
Joy 2000a. 
assessing visions according to their 
epistemic status and normative con-
tent. The results of these first two 
steps serve as the basis for a third 
step, “vision management,” which 
Grunwald describes as “a rational 
management of visions” (ibid.: 9-10; cf. 
also Grunwald 2006: 73-75). This re-
newed conception of vision assess-
ment should enable the development 
of criteria for a participative control-
ling of technological development by 
means of an accompanying and con-
structive technology assessment. 
Grunwald defines vision assessment as 
a further development of Leitbild-
oriented approaches in technology 
assessment and distinguishes it from 
the use of visions in venture manage-
ment. Compared to technical Leitbilder 
and guiding visions used in venture 
management, which are designed 
within the context of concrete techno-
logical developments and as depictions 
of the future relevant for practical af-
fairs, the visions Grunwald attempts to 
analyze are characterized by their 
long-term status and strongly specula-
tive elements. These visions thus func-
tion as a ‘nexus’ between Leitbilder 
and science fiction stories (Grunwald 
2004: 2, 4; cf. also Coenen 2004: 82-
85). By positioning the futuristic vi-
sions in question between technical 
Leitbilder relevant for practical affairs 
and speculative scenarios of science 
fiction literature, Grunwald bases his 
program of vision assessment on a 
relatively ‘open’ concept of ‘vision,’ 
comprising a combination of various 
types of knowledge (scientific facts, 
futuristic utopia, science-fiction sce-
narios, or social, economic and tech-
nological knowledge or skills etc.). 
Accordingly, visions are understood to 
be hybrids between various forms of 
knowledge (e.g. natural science, indus-
try and business, popular culture etc.). 
Because this vision concept also in-
cludes very speculative future scenar-
ios, it opens up the pragmatized vision 
term of Leitbild-research, which could 
be characterized by its closeness to a 
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plan or intention striving for realiza-
tion.8 However, the strategic intentions 
of Leitbild research have been retained 
in ‘vision management.’ The formative 
intention, on the other hand, subse-
quently connects the vision term again 
with its connotation as a realizable 
‘plan.’ 
Grunwald’s vision assessment claims 
to be applicable for the analysis, 
evaluation and formation of Leitbild-
like and futuristic visions. However, as 
one can see from the first results of an 
application of his program, it is pre-
cisely the formative intention of vision 
assessment which is based on actor-
theory and the literal interpretation of 
the visions’ contents which produce 
problems for the explanation of the 
mediality of speculative and futuristic 
visions whose analysis and evaluation 
Grunwald’s vision assessment aims to 
enable. 
 
4 Truth and Feasibility of 
Nanotechnological Visions 
The remarks on “nanotechnological 
visions” in the report of the technology 
assessment project “Nanotechnology” 
from the Office for Technology Assess-
ment of the German Parliament (TAB) 
in Berlin can be interpreted as an ex-
emplary and preliminary result of the 
vision assessment of nanotechnology 
as postulated by Grunwald (Paschen et 
al. 2004: 257-274).9 In this report the 
necessity of a “critical examination” of 
nanotechnological visions is recom-
                                                       
8 For example, the visions of science fiction 
do not lay claim to feasibility. Science fic-
tion authors use the future as a ‘space’ for 
thought experiments in order to play 
through possibilities other than current 
socio-technical constellations (cf. already 
Schwonke 1972: 61). Milburn’s analysis, for 
example, refers to the elimination of the 
differences and the increasing conver-
gences between visions of science-fiction 
literature and future visions of nanotech-
nological engineers (Milburn 2004). 
9 The following quotes from German 
sources have been translated. 
mended since it is “an important con-
tribution to the rational and relevant 
discussion about the future of 
nanotechnology” (ibid. 20). Through 
critical analysis, vision assessment 
could serve to identify exaggerated 
expectations and fears that might later 
become obstacles for innovation 
(ibid.). The analysis of widely distrib-
uted and futuristic visions is consid-
ered particularly relevant for this task. 
For technology assessment, “the ques-
tion may be raised regarding an ap-
propriate method of dealing with nan-
ofuturism” (Coenen 2004: 79). 
On an analytical level, answering this 
question suggests—comparable to the 
first two steps in Grunwald’s pro-
grammatic concept—first a categoriza-
tion and then an evaluation of the vi-
sions. In the TA report, these two steps 
are carried out simultaneously during 
the development of differentiating cri-
teria. Nanotechnological visions are 
divided into optimistic and pessimistic, 
unrealistic (utopian) and realistic as 
well as short-term and long-term vi-
sions. In comparison to the utopian 
visions, realistic visions, as the report 
states, are based on “contemporary 
scientific findings” and “do not con-
tradict the known natural laws” and 
the “structural conditions of the imag-
ined development.” “Long-term visions 
encompass time frames upwards from 
one and a half decades, short-term 
visions relate to the next fifteen years 
at the most” (Paschen et al. 2004: 257). 
The visions’ classifying differences, 
based on their chronological periodi-
zation, are connected to evaluating 
differences according to their epis-
temic status and the ethical desirability 
of their contents. 
The empirical basis of the report are 
visions which are currently being de-
bated by the European mass media, i.e. 
in Germany, which for the most part 
originated in the American context. 
These dominant nanotechnological 
visions are divided into two visionary 
discourses: The first discourse includes 
realistic short-term and long-term 
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visions in research policy, academic 
science, and industry which were de-
veloped in the National Nanotechnol-
ogy Initiative workshops (NNI) (ibid. 
19-20). Short-term realistic visions 
from the milieu of the NNI include the 
development of synthetic inner organs, 
technological substitutes for sensory 
organs, improvement in the reliability 
of electronic systems by increasing the 
precision of manufacture, as well as 
textiles with innovative functions and 
qualities (ibid: 263). Long-term visions 
are the images of new possibilities for 
telepresence, new ways of easing the 
aging process and of improving human 
capabilities, innovative goal-oriented 
medications, and invisible artifacts for 
surveillance purposes (ibid: 264; cf. 
Roco/Bainbridge 2002; Roco/Tomellini 
2002). The second discourse is accord-
ingly dominated by futuristic and uto-
pian long-term visions from the milieu 
of K. Eric Drexler’s Foresight Institute 
in California (Paschen et al. 2004: 19-
20). A particularly good example of the 
sort of optimistic, unrealistic visions to 
be found in this “strongly futuristic” 
utopian discourse are the visions of 
future nano-machines, suggested by 
Drexler in Engines of Creation (1986). 
These so-called assemblers could—if 
one is willing to believe Drexler—
someday produce practically all mac-
roscopic materials and products by 
molecular manufacturing (Paschen et 
al 2004: 268-269). Considered as unre-
alistic as these visions are those based 
on Drexler’s assembler images—for 
example, the pessimistic visions cre-
ated by Bill Joy which foresee the fall 
of man by nanomachines or nanoro-
bots gone out of control (ibid: 273).10 
The recommendations in the TA report 
for dealing with visions, i.e. “vision 
                                                       
10 This vision was the subject of a debate 
staged in Germany in mid-2000 in the 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, a daily 
newspaper which had reprinted Bill Joy’s 
article Why the future doesn’t need us, 
originally published in Wired Magazine (Joy 
2000a, 2000b). A synopsis of the debate is 
found in Schirrmacher 2001. 
management,” resulting from these 
procedural steps remain ambivalent: 
on the one hand, optimistic long-term 
visions could, in comparison to short-
term, product-related visions, better 
serve to awaken an interest for 
nanotechnology in the areas of aca-
demic science, politics, and industry as 
well as among the public. In addition, 
this type of vision would be suitable 
for assessing the future societal and 
technical implications of implementing 
nanotechnology and for initiating a 
related dialogue between the partici-
pating actors. On the other hand, there 
is a danger of promoting goals that are 
too ambitious and could thus end in 
disappointment. The popularization of 
optimistic futuristic visions also neces-
sarily conveys their opposites, that is, 
the popularization of pessimistic hor-
ror visions (ibid. 20, 319; cf. Coenen 
2004: 89). 
Vision assessment is thus stuck in a 
normative and strategic dilemma: on 
the one hand, futuristic and specula-
tive long-term visions are especially 
suitable for vision management 
since—in comparison to short-term 
realistic visions—they draw attention 
to future potentials of nanotechnology 
in forums of science, politics, econ-
omy, mass media, etc. simultaneously. 
On the other hand, their use seems 
very problematic when viewed from a 
normative perspective, since these 
future scenarios are not oriented to-
wards the criterion of scientific fact 
(epistemic status) and feasibility. An 
outline of a feasible plan is impossible 
from this perspective in the case of 
futuristic long-term visions, and thus, 
these visions can hardly function as 
guiding visions (Leitbilder) for the ac-
tors taking part in the innovation 
processes. Therefore, an evaluation of 
the normative desirability of antici-
pated societal implications of 
nanotechnological futures, which 
seems to be relevant for practical af-
fairs, cannot seriously be derived from 
these visions. The essential categoriza-
tion criterion for vision assessment is 
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thus the chronologically oriented dis-
tinction between short-term visions 
with little meaning and long-term vi-
sions with greater meaning. From a 
normative perspective, however, this 
greater meaning manifests itself as 
ambivalent for prospective and forma-
tive technology assessment.11 
The ambivalence of the recommenda-
tion can be interpreted as a result of 
the coupling of a mapped categoriza-
tion according to the chronological 
periodization, a content-related 
evaluation of visions according to their 
epistemic status, and the actor-theory 
based formative intention of technol-
ogy assessment. Vision assessment—
in opening up the term ‘vision’ used in 
Leitbild-research—also entitles specu-
lative and futuristic visions, such as 
those of science fiction, to a meaning-
ful function as media in communica-
tion processes. Thus, current scientific 
and technological conditions, as well 
as the vision’s derived chances of fea-
sibility based on these conditions, 
cannot function as the main evaluation 
criterion. The assessment of visions 
according to their reality or truth fac-
tor does not say anything about their 
mediality in communication processes. 
Thus, vision assessment should ana-
lyze and evaluate the mediality of 
widely distributed and futuristic vi-
sions regardless of the feasibility of the 
visions’ contents. Furthermore, the 
relevance of visions for strategic-
intentional formations of communica-
tion processes should not be used as a 
criterion of vision analyses and evalua-
tion. 
                                                       
11 A survey of experts from various scien-
tific and industrial backgrounds also con-
firmed that the chronological periodiza-
tions of nanotechnological visions of the 
future correspond to assessments of the 
visions’ feasibility or speculative content. 
See the results of the study commissioned 
by the German Federal Ministry of Educa-
tion and Research (Bundesministerium für 
Bildung und Forschung, BMBF) entitled 
Nanotechnologie pro Gesundheit 2003 (Far-
kas/Mohnfeld 2004). 
5 Futuristic and Realistic Scenar-
ios  
The relevance of an extension of vision 
assessment’s theoretical and meth-
odological instrument for the examina-
tion of widely distributed futuristic 
visions can be explained via the com-
parison of two types of scenarios de-
picting nanotechnological visions 
which are often used in different publi-
cation-domains (i.e. news media, 
popular and specialty science). Such 
scenarios can appear to be ‘unrealis-
tic.’ They include highly futuristic vi-
sions based on long-term develop-
ments like those featuring self-
sufficient medical nanorobots or mini-
submarines which transport medica-
tion purposefully to the focus of an 
illness inside the body and carry out 
surgical interventions directly inside 
arteries or cells (see Figure 1). The 
visions depicted in the scenarios can 
also be short-term, e.g. scenes which 
seem relatively ‘realistic,’ portraying 
the possible integration and use of 
nanotechnological products in future 
daily life, such as biocompatible hip 
joints, bicycle helmets that maintain 
contact with cyclists’ employers, and 
fabrics that are coated to resist stains 
(see Figure 2). 
Both types of scenarios attempt to 
represent the future potentials of cur-
rent nanotechnological research and 
product development. Both of the de-
picted future scenarios show familiar 
artifacts and modes of application, i.e. 
the use of a laptop in a sidewalk café, 
vehicles in city traffic, a spaceship or 
space station, red blood cells, a tube 
which resembles the interior of a hu-
man artery, etc. 
The depicted future innovations of the 
everyday scenario (Figure 2) are di-
rectly related to nanotechnological 
product innovations which are ex-
pected to be realized short-term. These 
innovations of the future should en-
able improved microsystems via new 
nanotechnologically produced coat-
ings and materials. 
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The scenario was developed by the 
magazine Pictures of the Future of the 
Siemens Corporation (Aschenbenner 
2003). The anticipated product innova-
tions refer directly to the lines of 
nanotechnological product develop-
ments in the company’s own field (cf. 
Eberl 2002; Jopp 2003: 71, 134, 145; 
Ilfrich 2004: 213). Due to the close link 
between the depicted future innova-
tions and current innovation proc-
esses, one could automatically inter-
pret these visions as being strategically 
utilizable Leitbild-like mediators in 
communication processes—for exam-
ple in corporate development agendas 
or in mediations between science and 
the public.12 The references to the fu-
ture are mediated in the scenario via 
the explanatory captions about the 
familiar artifacts and modes of applica-
tion. 
In contrast to this scenario, the ar-
rangement of the artifacts and modes 
of application in the nanorobot sce-
nario (Figure 1) emphasizes the nov-
                                                       
12 These are the Siemens Corporation re-
search-sector’s declared intentions for the 
development of such scenarios (Eberl 
2001). The same scenario is also found, 
with slight modifications, in an informa-
tional brochure published for the general 
public—e. g. school children—by the BMBF 
(BMBF 2004: 28-29). 
Figure 2: Nanotechnology in future everyday life. 
(Courtesy of Pictures of the Future, Siemens AG, Mu-
nich.) 
Figure 1: A medical nanorobot in an artery 
(Courtesy of Julian Baum / SPL / Agentur Focus.) 
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elty and speculativeness of the de-
picted future innovations without the 
use of explanatory captions. These and 
similar scenarios of medical nanoro-
bots and mini-submarines are found in 
the most diverse publications, for in-
stance in investment guides (e.g. 
Beckmann/Lenz 2002), in popular sci-
ence magazines (e.g. Drexler 2001), in 
the daily press (e.g. Haas 2003), or in 
medical specialist journals (e.g. Jordan 
2001).13 As compared to the everyday 
scenario, the nanorobot scenario does 
not refer to actual, current nanotech-
nological innovation processes. Press 
reports, for example, describe research 
projects on the development of mo-
lecular propulsion systems—which in 
the future should allegedly enable tar-
geted drug carrying against the blood-
stream—as a way of constructing mo-
tors for nanorobots or mini-
submarines. In reality, however, re-
search projects for the development of 
complex nanomachines—as they are 
depicted in the nanorobot scenario—
hardly exist (cf. i.e. Lindinger 2003; 
Traufetter 2000: 169; Hardy 1999). Al-
though—compared to the everyday 
scenario—the nanorobot scenario also 
depicts by all means familiar arti-
facts—for example the space-ship—
and modes of application—surgical 
interventions in the human body’s 
interior—the overall picture comes 
across as being unfamiliar and in need 
of interpretation. The artifacts and 
their modes of application are placed 
in environments in which they have 
not previously been found or ob-
served.14 Because the image places the 
artifact in use in the environment of a 
human artery, the artifact must be very 
small indeed. Thus it could be a vi-
sionary representation of a nanotech-
                                                       
13 Most of the images portraying such sce-
narios derive from the “Nanomedicine Art 
Gallery” organized by Robert A. Freitas on 
the homepage of the American Foresight 
Institute (Freitas 2004). 
14 Depictions of spaceships in the human 
body are only known from science fiction 
movies (i.e. Fantastic Voyage from 1966, 
based on the Isaac Asimov novel). 
nologically enabled medical product 
innovation—e.g. a miniaturized surgi-
cal microsystem. Various other—even 
contrary—interpretations of the sce-
nario would also be possible, depend-
ing on one’s point of view.  
Due to their need for interpretation 
and the multitude of possible interpre-
tations of the images’ contents, de-
pending on one’s perspective, such 
futuristic nanorobot-scenarios can 
hardly be interpreted as Leitbilder in 
innovation processes. However, it is 
also insufficient to interpret such fu-
turistic scenarios as merely strategic 
instruments which can be utilized by 
the actors for the intentional and goal-
oriented communication of future po-
tentials to influence innovation proc-
esses. Surely, unrealistic as well as 
realistic futuristic visions could be 
used for the strategic goal of convinc-
ing the public of the unforeseeable 
potentials of nanotechnology. This 
strategy has been used by American 
research politics, for example (cf. 
Paschen et al. 2004: 264). This, how-
ever, does not explain the medial func-
tionality of futuristic visions. 
How can we analyze and evaluate the 
specific mediality of such futuristic and 
speculative scenarios? As the following 
presentation of my case study on the 
mediality of such futuristic scenarios 
will show, such scenarios are used 
quite often in popular science maga-
zines, in business press as well as in 
daily and weekly newspapers, and oc-
casionally even in medical specialty 
journals for the depiction of future 
potentials of nanotechnology. They 
serve not only as illustrations for texts; 
moreover, statements in the texts refer 
argumentatively to the visionary 
themes represented by the scenarios. 
Futuristic scenarios—for example the 
nanorobot scenario—facilitate linkings 
between precisely those arguments 
which can be analytically attributed to 
statements of various discourses. It 
seems that it is precisely the futuristic 
scenarios’ ‘vague’ and ‘unclear’ refer-
ences and thus their openness for vari-
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ous interpretations which makes these 
images so suitable to serve as media-
tors in communications about futures. 
 
6 Futuristic Visions as Means of 
Communication (Case Study) 
6.1 The Distribution of Futuristic 
Nanorobot-Scenarios 
Since approximately 2000, articles in 
German daily and weekly newspapers 
regularly cite a certain German re-
search project as an explanatory ex-
ample for the innovative potentials of 
current medical nanotechnological 
research and development: the devel-
opment of a new technique for the 
treatment of brain tumors by the bi-
ologist and medical doctor Andreas 
Jordan of the Berlin clinic Charité (e.g. 
Traufetter 2000; Pantle 2000; Wüsthof 
2002; Lindinger 2004). Jordan, in co-
operation with the Center for Biomedi-
cal Nanotechnology (CBN) and the In-
stitute for New Materials (INM) in Saar-
brücken, succeeded in ‘killing’ cancer 
cells in brain tumors by heating iron 
oxide-containing nanoparticles in a 
magnetic field. Jordan and his team 
used the ‘Magnetic Fluid Hyperther-
mia’ (MFH) method and the ‘magnetic 
field applicator’ therapy system devel-
oped by the MagForce Applications 
GmbH and MFH Hyperthermiesysteme 
GmbH companies (e.g. Jordan 2001; 
MFH 2003; Ärzte Zeitung 2003). Jor-
dan’s success in cancer research is 
presented by the press as being possi-
ble preliminary stages for the devel-
opment of complex nanomachines, 
which in the distant future will merely 
need to be injected into the blood-
stream and which will then be able to 
find their own way—as ‘intelligent’ 
drugs—to the respective illness focus 
in the body. Since the end of the 
1990’s, such futuristic visions have 
been illustrated in the press primarily 
with visionary images (such as Figure 
1) which are supposed to depict so-
called medical nanorobots performing 
surgical operations or mini-
submarines transporting drugs in the 
human bloodstream (e.g. Haas 2003, 
Traufetter 2000). These visionary im-
ages are clearly futuristic and, due to 
their highly-speculative contents, do 
not refer to actual Charité research or 
to other studies on drug delivery sys-
tems. Since the reports about Jordan’s 
success are documents from daily and 
weekly newspapers, it stands to reason 
that such visionary images serve pri-
marily to ‘sensationalize’ the presenta-
tion of information in the mass media.  
The analysis of documents on Jordan’s 
cancer therapy procedure in medical 
specialty journals led me to a surpris-
ing result, however: Jordan himself 
uses an almost identical futuristic im-
age of a nanorobot in the human body 
as that which is used in daily and 
weekly newspapers—for instance, in 
an article in Der Onkologe (The On-
cologist) (Jordan 2001). In this article, 
he attempts to convey the innovative 
significance of his Hyperthermia-
technique with nanoscaled iron oxide 
particles for tumor therapy. “At first 
glance,” Jordan argues, “the overall 
impression is that nanotechnology 
merely conveys visions ..., for instance, 
the ‘nanorobots’ or other endovascular 
devices especially for applications in 
medicine ... but they appear more con-
crete when you look more closely and 
concentrate on the partial solutions 
and production approaches, which are 
already being implemented, e.g., using 
the nanoparticles and nano carrier 
systems” (Jordan 2001: 1080). Jordan 
utilizes the image argumentatively to 
distance his own research, on the one 
hand, from previous research in his 
field on the other. At the same time, 
his use of the visionary image distin-
guishes the short-term anticipated 
successes of his own research from the 
futurism of the visions depicted in the 
nanorobot image (Jordan 2001: 1074-
1080; see Lösch 2004a: 198; Lösch 
2004b). 
Similarly, since approximately 2000, 
the same and similar visionary images 
of nanorobots and mini-submarines, 
often accompanied by line-graphs, 
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have been used by the business press 
to represent the rise and fall of 
nanotech companies or the market 
value of nanotech shares. According to 
a report about nanotech investment 
options, “many a researcher is dream-
ing of the implementation of 
nanomachines which are invisible to 
the human eye. … With this vision, 
one removes oneself definitively from 
the substance of typical conversations 
with an investment advisor” (Knob 
2000: C5). A similar report states: “at 
least ten years will pass before the first 
complex nanomachines will appear on 
the market. … Nanotech turnovers will 
skyrocket until 2010 …. Nanophase is 
one of the very few nano-companies 
on the stock market which actually 
specializes in the manufacturing of 
particles …. The share is highly specu-
lative, but due to marketable products, 
it’s a good deal” (Freise/Janich 2002: 
22-24). The visions of nanorobots and 
mini-submarines are described in the 
texts, depending on the current eco-
nomic situation, as either a long-term 
objective of medical research of par-
ticular interest to investors or as ex-
amples of the futuristic ideas of nano-
research which are not expected to 
produce marketable products (e.g. 
Grotelüschen 2001; Freise/Janich 2002; 
Waters 2003). 
Based on these starting observations, I 
posed the following questions for the 
case study: How can I explain the ar-
gumentative use of the same futuristic 
scenarios in the various domains of 
publication? Do the visionary images 
in the documents have a medial func-
tion which enables interfaces between 
different types of argumentation? Are 
these argumentations characteristic of 
statements in prototypical scientific, 
economic and mass medial dis-
courses? Can the images be evaluated 
as media which motivate communica-
tions between the various discourses 
about the future potentials of nano-
technology? 
6.2 Discourse-Specific Evaluations of 
the Visions  
During the overall analysis of the 
documents from the publication do-
mains ‘daily and weekly newspapers,’ 
‘business press,’ ‘popular science 
magazines,’ and ‘medical specialty 
journals’ published between the mid 
1990’s and the end of 2004 (research 
period), I was able to analytically dif-
ferentiate—even within the documents 
of one domain—three clearly distin-
guishable types of statements. All of 
these statements place certain themes 
of the visionary images in relation to 
discourse-specific evaluations of cur-
rent research and development in 
medical micro- and nanotechnology 
(for the analyzed text sample and the 
relevance criteria of document selec-
tion, see the appendix). 
Depending on the focus of the articles, 
but also depending on the lines of ar-
guments within the articles, the texts 
refer to the visionary images in three 
different forms: 
1. Based on current research and 
development, either the fictionality 
or the feasibility of future nanoro-
bots and mini-submarines is 
stressed. 
2. Nanorobots and micro-submarines 
are described either as being an-
ticipated incremental enhance-
ments of current pharmaceutical 
drug carrier research or as radical 
innovations which will replace pre-
vious micro-surgical technologies. 
3. Nanorobots and mini-submarines 
are described as being either re-
sults of the progressive miniaturi-
zation of traditional surgical tech-
nologies or as products of a wholly 
new nanotechnological design of 
molecules. 
Orientation towards the systems-
theoretical differentiation between 
social systems and their codes and 
programs (e.g. Luhmann 1995b; 2000) 
allows me to attribute exactly those 
image references in the texts that—
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according to the distinction 
‘truth/untruth’—question the feasibil-
ity of the represented vision to state-
ments of scientific discourses. Image 
references concerning the marketabilty 
of the pictured future product—
according to the distinction ‘market 
value/no market value’—are classified 
as statements of economic discourses. 
Finally, those image references refer-
ring to the novelty of the depicted 
nanotechnological artifact—according 
to the ‘new information/old non-
information’ distinction—are attrib-
uted to statements of mass medial 
discourses. All references or ascrip-
tions of meaning to the images’ con-
tents during the investigation period 
again can be categorized into three 
different semantic fields: science fic-
tion, medicine, and technology. Scien-
tific discourses refer to the relation-
ship between science and fiction. Eco-
nomic discourses consider the rela-
tionship between incremental en-
hancements and radical innovations in 
medicine. Last but not least, mass me-
dial discourses refer to the correlation 
between familiar microtechnological 
miniaturizations and a novel 
nanotechnological design of molecules 
(see Table 1). 
This table and analytical model of dis-
course-specific image references 
shows how the representations in the 
visionary images during the research 
period are used by analytically differ-
entiated scientific, economic and mass 
medial discourses for the evaluation of 
future potentials of current research 
and development in the field of medi-
cal nanotechnology. 
During the following course of exami-
nation, I raised the question whether 
and how the effects and results of re-
ciprocal communication between sci-
entific, economic and mass medial 
discourses could be empirically ana-
lyzed with the help of this analytical 
model: Which trends or modifications 
of the discourse-specific references to 
the visionary images can we observe 
within the research period (mid-1990’s 
until the end of 2004)? Do such modi-
fications correlate to observable reas-
sessments of the depicted visions—for 
instance the fictionality instead of the 
feasibility in scientific discourses? 
6.3 Discourse-Specific Reassessments 
over Time  
Within the research period, three tem-
poral periods with corresponding for-
mations of communicative effects can 
be distinguished. In these periods, the 
specific evaluations of the future po-
tentials of current nanomedical re-
search and development in scientific, 
economic and mass medial discourses 
modify themselves. These modifica-
tions in each of the discourses corre-
spond to changes in the discourse-
specific image references (see Table 
2).15 
                                                       
15 For a more extensive representation of 
this temporal reconstruction, see Lösch 
(2006). The temporal reconstruction of 
 Table 1: Discourse-Specific Image References  
 Discourse Topic Semantic field  
 Science 
 
Feasibility 
 
Science vs. Fiction  
 Economy Marketability Incremental enhance-
ments vs. radical inno-
vations in medicine 
 
 Mass media Novelty Miniaturization of tech-
nology vs. molecular 
construction 
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The textual contexts of the visionary 
images in the three periods can be 
described as follows: 
The first period (end of 1990s until 
mid-2000) is characterized by a mood 
of ‘starting up’ in science and econ-
omy. The first possibilities of the tran-
sition from basic research to industrial 
application become apparent. The arti-
cles usually begin with a description of 
futuristic visions of nanorobots and 
micro-submarines which, in the course 
of the article, are contrasted by the 
description of market-oriented re-
search plans on nanoparticles in the 
field of drug targeting. Starting in early 
2000, an example of promising re-
search which is often cited is the—
already mentioned—research of Jor-
dan on brain tumor treatment at the 
Berlin Clinic Charité (cf. e.g. Müller 
                                                                  
these image-communications is based on 
results of the discourse analyses of docu-
ments from popular science magazines, 
business press and German daily and 
weekly newspapers. I also reconstructed 
the table of discourse-specific image refer-
ences (see Table 1) in documents from 
medical journals. However, the examina-
tion of these specialty science documents 
over the short investigation period of my 
case study showed no significantly differ-
entiable ‘temporal’ periods of image com-
munication (as in Table 2). This result can 
be explained, among other things, by the 
weak sensitivity of specialty science publi-
cations to events, for example in compari-
son to the press. 
1998; Kotthaus 1999; Traufetter 2000; 
Pantle 2000). 
The second period (mid 2000 to late 
2001) is characterized by a disen-
chantment of economic expectations. 
Industrial nanotechnological break-
throughs were not realized as fast as 
one had expected. With the market-
crash of the IT-branch, the problemati-
zation of nanotechnology is adopted 
as possible hype and mere fad. At the 
same time, as a result of the Bill Joy 
debate caused by the publication of his 
pessimistic vision Why the Future 
Doesn’t Need Us (Joy 2000b) in the 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, the 
articles problematize the possible 
negative effects of futuristic visions for 
the public’s—including also potential 
investors’—view of nanotechnology 
(cf. e.g. Knop 2000; Jung 2001; Vasek 
2000). 
Although previously low sales in-
creases of nanotech companies were 
often brought up at the beginning of 
the third period (starting in 2002), it 
can be characterized by an increasing 
hope for the progress of nanoparticle 
research and the production of mar-
ketable products enabled by new 
nanoparticles (cf. e.g. Knop 2003; Wa-
ters 2003). The progress of the experi-
ments with nanoparticles for tumor 
therapy at the Charité clinic and prod-
uct developments by companies in the 
field of drug targeting, for example 
Capsolution AG, are viewed as evi-
dence for an increasing development 
of marketable products in the pharma-
ceutical industry (cf. e.g. Wüsthof 
2002; Freise/Janich 2002). Nanoparti-
cles are dubbed “huge market con-
querors” (Knop 2003). At the same 
time, the effect of the thriller Prey by 
author Michael Crichton, in which he 
depicts the catastrophic scenario of a 
swarm of nanorobots gone wild, is 
controversial with regard to the pub-
lic’s conception of nanotechnology (cf. 
e.g. Crichton 2002; Saxl 2002; Heckl 
2002). In this phase, the debate be-
tween K. Eric Drexler and Richard 
Smalley over the feasibility of the pro-
Table 2: Periodization of the Image-
Communication 
Period Topic 
Start up 
(late 1990s to 
mid-2000) 
Future nanorobots 
 
Problematization 
(mid-2000 to late 
2001) 
Market damaging 
nanorobots 
 
Fictionalization 
(starting approx. 
2002) 
Metaphorical 
nanorobots 
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duction of nano-assemblers also 
reaches its peak. Molecular nano-
assemblers, and also all complex 
nanomachines, are increasingly being 
classified as fictional visions (cf. e.g. 
Baum 2003; Haas 2003). 
The same or similar visionary images 
of nanorobots (such as Figure 1) and 
mini-submarines are used in the arti-
cles in all three periods.16 The types of 
statements in the texts which I attrib-
uted analytically to the three dis-
courses place their specific evaluations 
of current innovation processes of 
nanotechnology in relation to themes 
of the depicted visions. These relations 
correspond in each period to dis-
course-specific semantics (see Table 
1). But these relations vary over the 
course of time, changing between the 
two sides of the semantics’ dichoto-
mies. 
1. In the start up and problematiza-
tion periods (from the end of 
1990s until the end of 2001) scien-
                                                       
16 For the Start Up Period see e.g. Müller 
1998; Traufetter 2000; for the Problemati-
zation Period e.g. Knop 2000; Jung 2001; 
Drexler 2001; for the Fictionalization Pe-
riod e.g. Freise/Janich 2002; Knop 2003; 
Haas 2003. 
tific discourses interpret the vi-
sionary images of nanomachines 
as being representations of future 
innovations whose feasibility is 
said to be dependent on scientific-
technological advancements, i.e. 
the nanotechnological develop-
ment of suitable propulsion sys-
tems for miniaturized micro-
machines. In the fictionalization 
period (starting roughly in 2002), 
the references of scientific dis-
courses instead emphasize the fic-
tionality of such visions (see Quo-
tations 1). 
2. This modification of image refer-
ences in scientific discourses over 
the course of time can be inter-
preted as a reaction to the prob-
lematization of a market-
damaging effect of nanorobot vi-
sions in economic discourses 
(starting roughly in mid-2000) 
which holds the popularization of 
futuristic visions of nanorobots 
and mini-submarines responsible 
for investors’ lack of interest. In 
contrast to current incremental in-
novations via nanoparticle prod-
ucts in the pharmaceutical area, 
these visions are said to represent 
nanotechnology as being a radical 
innovation whose future market-
ability is allegedly too uncertain 
and thus incites no interest among 
investors. In the fictionalization 
period (starting approx. in 2002) 
this assessment in economic dis-
courses finally switches to an in-
terpretation of nanotechnological 
developments in general as being 
hopeful steps on the way to radical 
and marketable innovations of the 
future (see Quotations 2). 
3. In the start up period (from late 
1990s until mid-2000) mass medial 
discourses evaluate the visionary 
images as being representations of 
future microsystems which as-
sume an absolutely novel molecu-
lar design of atoms and molecules. 
Quotations 1: Exemplary image-
references of scientific discourses 
Start up and problematization periods: 
“Nano-technicians will shrink diagnoses 
and repair instruments down to molecular 
size. … The nanorobots will react immedi-
ately to diseases in the earliest stage … The 
micro-submarine has already been 
launched as a prototype. … It is still uncer-
tain what kind of operating power these 
machines will use … Nanotechnology is no 
longer merely a utopia—reality is already 
catching up to science fiction novels … 
Scientists are exploring the nanoworld, step 
by step” (Traufetter 2000: 169-171). 
Fictionalization period: “Science Fiction: A 
mini-robot travels through the bloodstream” 
(Knob 2003: 39). “Nanorobots are injected 
into a blood vessel via syringe. There, they 
remove arterial blockages. These helpful 
machines exist only in fantasy” (Haas 2003: 
28). 
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In the fictionalization period 
(starting roughly in 2002) their 
evaluation change to an interpre-
tation of the visions as being rep-
resentative and metaphorical de-
pictions of nanoparticle-products 
in the areas of medicine and 
pharmaceutical drug targeting—
enabled by a totally new molecu-
lar construction. Only a short time 
before, in mid-2000, mass medial 
discourses discuss the exact same 
research and product develop-
ments in the medical and pharma-
ceutical sectors as the tried and 
true miniaturization of pharma-
ceutical ingredients, but did not 
connect them to visions of nano-
robots and mini-submarines (see 
Quotations 3). 
In contrast to the aim of constructing 
complex nanomachines—such as 
nanorobots and mini-submarines—
which should be enabled through mo-
lecular design and the ongoing minia-
turization of microsystems, pharma-
ceutical research with nanoparticles 
for drug carrier systems is one of the 
main current areas of nanotechnologi-
cal research and development, which 
has already produced marketable 
products. The shifting of scientific as 
well as mass medial image references 
enables economic discourses to inter-
pret nanoparticles as radical but at the 
same time marketable innovations 
with high future potentials in the fic-
tionalization period. 
 
7 Conclusion and Discussion 
7.1 Systems-Theoretical Interpreta-
tion of the Results 
Viewed over the course of time we 
recognize fundamental reassessments 
of the discourse-specific evaluations of 
the future potentials of current devel-
opments of nanotechnology for medi-
cal and pharmaceutical fields. These 
reassessments are empirically observ-
able based on the shifting of image 
references in the three discourses to 
the topics of futuristic scenarios. I in-
terpret the temporal shifting as being 
the result of communications between 
the discourses. This conclusion is 
based on the observation that the re-
assessment of the future potentials in 
each of the discourses—for example in 
economic discourses—react to the 
reassessments in each of the other 
discourses—for instance, in scientific 
and mass medial discourses. I have 
determined a specific mediality of the 
analyzed futuristic scenarios within the 
communication processes which 
would not have been analyzable using 
a literal interpretation of the visions’ 
contents and themes and by searching 
for the ‘hidden’ strategic interests of 
Quotations 2: Exemplary image-
references of economic discourses 
Problematization period: “Many a re-
searcher is dreaming of the implementation 
of nanomachines which are invisible to the 
human eye and which can self-replicate to 
build new machines. … With this vision, one 
removes oneself definitively from the sub-
stance of typical conversations with an in-
vestment advisor” (Knob 2000: C5). “With 
these visions, ‘nano’ became a media sensa-
tion… Visionaries are talking about the 
possibilities. Engineers need feasible con-
cepts… Therefore, visions are bad-
advertizing for the area of research” (Vasek 
2000: 18). “It’s not hard to produce parti-
cles, the procedure has been known for 
generations. … After many years of basic 
research, scientists are on the verge of cash-
ing in on their knowledge. They are found-
ing companies and rushing the first prod-
ucts onto the market” (Jung 2001: 98). 
Fictionalization period: “Nanotechnology 
will revolutionize industry and produce a 
billion-dollar market … The market fore-
casts for the nano-future are impressive… 
Like the internet, nanotechnology will likely 
enter almost every sector … In the pharma-
ceutical industry, molecular-design re-
searchers are promising shorter develop-
ment periods and higher effectiveness of 
medications. But nanotechnology also offers 
new opportunities for the administration of 
drugs. ‘Medications can be directed via 
nanotechnological encapsulation directly to 
the focus of the disease’” (Freise/Janich 
2002: 22-24). 
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the actors behind the use of the vi-
sionary images. 
Niklas Luhmann has stated that cur-
rent descriptions of the future can be 
interpreted as indications for the gen-
eral frameworks and forms of future-
configuring decisions within commu-
nication processes between social sub-
systems. Future conditions are de-
pendent on decisions made in the pre-
sent (Luhmann 1992a: 136, see also 
Luhmann 1982). The futuristic scenar-
ios, in this sense, serve as the common 
and shared media in communication 
processes. As I mentioned in the Intro-
duction of this article, the systems-
theoretical communication concept 
defines communication as the system-
specific processing of disconcerting 
information. From this theoretical per-
spective, communication between dis-
courses can be described as follows: 
Discourse-specific interpretations of 
the scenarios’ contents and themes—
for example in a scientific discourse—
disconcert other discourses—for ex-
ample, economic discourses. This 
prompts the other discourses to mod-
ify their discourse-specific evaluations 
of the innovative potentials of current 
research and development. The ob-
servable effects of these reassessments 
are modifications of their own refer-
ences to the visionary images. 
In his communication theory, 
Luhmann distinguishes between three 
dimensions of meaning: According to 
this differentiation, visions extend the 
current symbolic system in the mate-
rial dimension in light of unfamiliar 
futures. Via unfamiliar connections 
between symbols and reality, these 
visions encourage different ways of 
thinking. They accelerate interpreta-
tion efforts and contribute to the de-
velopment of expectations—both dis-
course-specific as well as via the crea-
tion of convergences between the dis-
courses. In the social dimension, the 
visions enable the stabilization of cer-
tain formations of assessments of fu-
ture options within the communica-
tions between the discourses. In the 
temporal dimension, however, such 
fixations turn out to be only tempo-
rary. Realities which do not turn out as 
anticipated make accompanying ad-
justments of once-fixed assessments 
necessary. These ongoing adjustments 
are facilitated by the scenarios’ 
polysemy and need for interpretation 
(Luhmann 1992a: 137-141). 
7.2 Implications for the Vision As-
sessment Program 
I will now explain the relevance of my 
case study’s results and their systems-
theoretical interpretation for the vision 
assessment of future technologies. 
With my case study I supplied evidence 
for the idea that the visions function as 
means of communication between 
discourses not due to a ‘mediation’—
in the sense of a transfer of knowl-
edge—but rather due to their ability to 
Quotations 3: Exemplary image-
references of mass medial discourses 
Start up period: “Nanotechnology is more 
than the shrinking of gearwheels and com-
puter chips, it is a whole new way of think-
ing … Can human beings produce an artifi-
cial world in which atoms and molecules 
can be used like building blocks? ... Is it 
possible to program these nanomachines so 
that they can build and copy themselves as 
often as is required?” (Müller 1998: 52). 
Problematization period: “Such successes 
[in the development of medications; A.L.], 
however, are based on the miniaturization 
of ingredients … This contradicts the defini-
tions of nanotechnology as the building of 
complex structures using the very smallest 
elements” (Knob 2000). 
Fictionalization period: “Physicians are 
dreaming of nanorobots which cruise 
through our bloodstreams on their own … 
In 1959, the American physicist Richard P. 
Feynman described … the idea of being able 
to directly manipulate atoms and molecules 
one day. This vision has since become real-
ity … Some nanoparticles have … com-
pletely new qualities. However, it is pre-
cisely this which gives nanotechnology its 
appeal, because when one has mastered the 
laws of the nanoworld, one can create new 
things” (Haas 2003: 28). 
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link various interpretations of their 
contents as well as their discourse-
specific processing. The visionary im-
ages of the case study enable scien-
tific, economic, as well as mass medial 
assessments of current developments 
in regard to possible development op-
tions of the future. The discussion of 
the same visionary images from scien-
tific, economic and mass medial points 
of view facilitates communication be-
tween otherwise incompatible evalua-
tions of innovation potentials via sci-
entific, economic and mass medial 
discourses. In other words, the images 
bridge the gaps between different 
‘worlds’ of society. 
The norm for the evaluation of the 
medial effectiveness of the depicted 
futuristic visions in the case study 
cannot be the realization of future in-
novations as they are anticipated by 
the visions. As shown in my case 
study, visions can function as media in 
communications which are relevant for 
formatting the future. Whether and 
how certain visions function in this 
way can only be assessed based on 
temporal reconstructions of self-
modifying correlations between dis-
course-perspective references to vi-
sions and discourse-specific evalua-
tions of the potentials of current inno-
vation processes. In this sense, the 
occurrence of the communication itself 
is the norm for the evaluation of the 
medial effectiveness of visions. 
For the procedural steps of the current 
program of vision assessment (com-
pare Chapter 3), my results call for the 
following modifications: On the vision 
analysis level, the systems-theory ori-
ented analysis of the mediality of vi-
sions enables inferences as to how 
certain evaluations of future potentials 
are stabilized between discourses 
within communication processes (so-
cial dimension). In addition, my analy-
sis shows how these formations of 
discourse-specific evaluations can 
again be destabilized over the course 
of subsequent communication proc-
esses in the face of progressing current 
developments of technological innova-
tions (temporal dimension). How and 
to what extent a specific vision func-
tions as a means of communication 
can be examined based on the variety 
of linkings between anticipated futures 
and present realities which a specific 
vision makes possible for the involved 
discourses (material dimension). 
Instead of a normative vision evalua-
tion, my approach enables a functional 
evaluation of the mediality of the vi-
sions in communication processes. 
The medial effectiveness of the visions 
eludes a ‘direct’ strategic vision man-
agement, which is suggested by the 
actor-theory orientation and the for-
mative intention of the current vision 
assessment program. Intervention into 
the communication processes via vi-
sion management is, however, ‘indi-
rectly’ made possible: Through the 
questioning of certain references of 
discourses—e.g of science, economy, 
and mass media—to the visions’ con-
tents and themes, discourse-specific 
productions of meaning can be recur-
sively influenced. But one will not be 
able to predict and plan the concrete 
effects of this influence of discourse-
specific evaluations of future poten-
tials. The effects of such interventions, 
however, have been observed in the 
case study based on how, for example, 
economic discourses process the dis-
concerting references to the visions’ 
contents and themes of other dis-
courses, for example scientific and 
mass medial. These insights into the 
communicative function of futuristic 
visions must now be made utilizable 
for vision management. 
The relevance of my systems-
theoretical and discourse-analytical 
extension of the theoretical-methodo-
logical instrument of the vision as-
sessment program is not limited to the 
analysis and evaluation of speculative 
and futuristic visions, however. This 
approach could also be used for the 
analysis of the mediality of realistic 
and present-related scenarios (such as 
Figure 2). The relevance of my exten-
122 STI Studies 2006: 103-125 
 
sion of the vision assessment program, 
however, emerges significantly for the 
analysis of the mediality of futuristic-
speculative scenarios. 
8 Appendix 
The case study is a part of the project 
Spaces of Medical Micro- and 
Nanotechnology: Case Studies in the 
Sociology of Knowledge on how Tech-
nological Innovations are Negotiated 
and Mediated. The overall project ex-
amines the mediating role of visions—
especially in their pictorial form—in 
communications of scientific, eco-
nomic, and mass medial discourses 
about the future potential of current 
research and development in medical 
micro- and nanotechnology. 
 
In the relevant documents of the pre-
sented case study, the nanorobot-
image of this article (Figure 1) appears 
along with three very similar images of 
nanorobots and mini-submarines (see 
Table 3; relevance criterion of docu-
ment selection: current nanomedical 
research and development are coupled 
with future visions of ‘nanomachines’). 
 Table 3: Distribution of the visionary images in relevant documents  
 Publication domains Documents of 
the case study  
Images of 
nanomachi-
nes 
(4 images) 
Documents of 
the overall pro-
ject 
 
 Science (specialist journals 
and popular science maga-
zines) 
35 17 81  
 Economy (newspapers and 
magazines) 
10 7 34  
 Mass Media (daily and 
weekly newspapers) 
38 21 121  
 Total 83 45 236  
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Abstract 
The paper deals with hybrid systems, where human actors and non-human agents 
meet and interact. Different from most of the literature on autonomous technol-
ogy, which mainly deals with the question of agency of non-humans, the paper 
puts forward the assumption that the release of smart technology may lead to a 
deconstruction of order or even a regime change, thus raising the question of how 
order emerges in hybrid systems. Discussing different sociological concepts, the 
paper identifies two modes of governance: central control and decentralized self-
organization. However, smart technology allows implementing different system's 
architectures, some of which may go beyond this traditional distinction. Referring 
to a case study on collision avoidance in aviation (and especially the mid-air colli-
sion at Ueberlingen in 2002), the paper shows that hybrid systems create new op-
portunities, but entail new risks as well. The release of smart technology seems to 
intensify well-known problems of automation, especially when systems get out of 
control. Aviation is one of the societal fields, where experiments with new modes 
of governance currently take place that combine features of central control and 
decentralized self-organization. 
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1 Introduction: The problem of 
(social) order 
Modern knowledge societies find 
themselves in a situation that may turn 
out as the threshold of a new era, 
which is constituted by a new relation-
ship of man and machine, of technol-
ogy and society. Smart agents are now 
being released in large numbers into 
the real world, which are stupid com-
pared to human beings, but can gener-
ate "intelligent" behaviour if they are 
interconnected to large networks. 
Smart technical agents meet human 
actors more and more frequently, and 
they interact and coordinate their ac-
tions. Artificial societies emerge and 
mingle with human societies. Hybrid 
systems come into being which are 
constituted of human and non-human 
decision makers. 
Sociology has reacted to this phe-
nomenon in different ways: Bruno La-
tour and others raised the question of 
agency of non-humans and proposed a 
symmetric ontology (cf. Latour 1998). 
However, the primary focus of Latour 
has always been the claim that non-
humans have to be accepted as equal 
ranked co-players, disregarding the 
question of the specific features of the 
interaction of humans and (smart, 
autonomous) non-humans in distrib-
uted systems – and whether it differs 
from other types of interaction. Other 
researchers in the fields of "artificial 
societies" (cf. Epstein/Axtell 1996, Macy 
1998) and "socionics" (cf. Malsch 1997, 
Kron 2002) have tried to utilize their 
knowledge of human societies and to 
transfer it analogously to artificial so-
cieties in order to create more realistic 
designs of multi-agent systems that – 
conversely – help to better understand 
how social order emerges out of the 
interaction of utility maximizing a-
gents. Despite of many insights about 
the functioning and especially the dy-
namics of distributed systems, the ob-
vious shortcoming of this kind of re-
search has been that it is not suited to 
explore the interaction of real humans 
and artificial agents. 
Thus the question remains unresolved, 
how orderly structures emerge in hy-
brid systems, which consist of human 
actors and non-human agents. Refer-
ring to human societies, the term "so-
cial order" typically implies 
• the existence of various self-
interested actors (thus establishing 
the need to regulate the processes 
of interaction and exchange by 
some kind of rule-set), 
• a mechanism of the generation of 
mutual expectations and trust as a 
base of cooperation, and finally 
• the sedimentation of proven pat-
terns of interaction in the form of 
stable societal institutions which 
serve as constraints and generate a 
kind of momentum as well (cf. 
Esser 1993, Weyer 1993a, Schimank 
2005). 
If we refer to hybrid systems, many 
questions still are unresolved, e.g. 
• how interaction works, if actors 
and agents are involved (and, be-
sides, if we are allowed to apply the 
term "interaction" to these proc-
esses at all), 
• how a certainty of expectation can 
be achieved, which is – referring to 
Uwe Schimank (1992) – an inevita-
ble prerequisite for strategic action 
in modern societies, and finally 
• how rules, norms and even institu-
tions emerge in hybrid systems, 
that guarantee a certain amount of 
integration and stability and make 
possible the governance of this new 
type of systems – in a way that 
avoids risks and allows for a safe 
conduct of operations. 
Referring mainly to the third item, the 
following paper will show that smart 
technology allows for creating hybrid 
systems, which offer the opportunity of 
a regime change (in aviation and in 
other large technical systems as well) 
by deconstructing the old order and 
establishing a new order that entails a 
new mode of governance. Additionally, 
hybrid systems seem to open up differ-
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ent options to go beyond the tradi-
tional distinction of the two well-
known governance modes: central 
control and decentralized self-organi-
zation. Hybrid systems create new op-
portunities, but entail new risks as 
well. Aviation is one of the societal 
fields, where experiments with new 
modes of governance currently take 
place. 
1.1 Preview of chapters 
Chapter 2 of the paper sketches the 
research on smart technology and hy-
brid systems and tries to identify dif-
ferent arguments in the analysis of the 
interaction of man and smart ma-
chines. One thesis that can frequently 
be found in literature is the assertion 
that the introduction of smart technol-
ogy increases uncertainty and risk, 
leading to a deconstruction of tradi-
tional patterns of social order (chapter 
2.1). These tendencies mostly are re-
lated to a new type of distributed sys-
tems, which are able to generate prac-
tical solutions by means of self-organi-
zation in decentralized networks, thus 
establishing a new kind of autono-
mous technology (chapter 2.2). This 
issue has been integrated into a socio-
logical theory of distributed agency by 
Werner Rammert and Ingo Schulz-
Schaeffer (chapter 2.3). However, they 
did not deal with the creation of order 
which is at the centre of this paper. In 
the work of Gene Rochlin some hints 
can be found concerning the manage-
ment of complex systems, leading to a 
classification of types of order. Thus 
the question can be raised, whether 
smart technology facilitates the con-
struction of new modes of governance 
of complex systems, which go beyond 
the traditional distinction of central-
ized control and decentralized self-
organization (chapter 2.4). 
Referring to this state of the art of re-
search on smart technology chapter 3 
presents a case study on the Traffic 
Alert and Collision Avoidance System 
(TCAS) – one of the first cases of a hy-
brid system that failed and contributed 
to a catastrophe in aviation in 2002. 
The invention and introduction of 
TCAS can be regarded as the transfor-
mation of the traditional, hierarchical 
system of air traffic control (ATC) and 
the creation of a new type of order in 
aviation. The paper presents insights 
into the operational logic of TCAS 
(chapter 3.1), especially into the inter-
play of human actors and non-human 
agents (chapter 3.2) and then analyses 
in a Perrow-like style the causes of the 
mid-air collision near Ueberlingen in 
2002 (chapter 3.3). 
Chapter 4 first asks, if the debate on 
"pervasive computing" may serve as a 
framework even for the analysis of 
TCAS (4.1), and then tries to answer 
the question of whether modern avia-
tion can be regarded as a hybrid sys-
tem of distributed agency (4.2). It then 
summarizes the argument of the 
change from the old regime of central-
ized control to the new regime of de-
centralized self-organization more 
systematically (4.3). Chapter 4.4 finally 
outlines the perspectives of future 
aviation that go beyond this distinc-
tion, leading to a short conclusion 
(chapter 5). 
 
2 Smart technology and hybrid 
systems 
2.1 Pervasive computing 
In aviation, in road traffic as well as in 
many other sectors of society we can 
presently observe a new type of tech-
nology emerging which differs to some 
respect from the (automation) tech-
nology of past decades. It has been 
labelled "pervasive" or "ubiquitous 
computing". The visions of the engi-
neers suggest that in future a large 
number of smart, embedded agents 
will monitor and control our actions 
and help us to manage our everyday 
life ("smart washing machine") or dan-
gerous situations e.g. in traffic ("smart 
assistant systems"). These agents may 
become more and more autonomous, 
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thus displacing the human decision 
maker. 
Referring to Marc Weiser, who first 
outlined the vision of ubiquitous com-
puting in 1991, Friedemann Mattern 
(2003) describes the vision of a world, 
which is inhabited by miniaturized, 
sensor-equipped devices that have the 
capability of context-awareness, i.e. 
they can observe their environment 
and can react to a change of certain 
parameters (such as light, tempera-
ture, speed, distance etc.). These smart 
devices are part of almost any object 
(desk, window, door, coffee machine 
etc.) and can communicate the col-
lected data with other parts of the sys-
tem (cf. TA-Swiss 2003b). 
According to Mattern and others, a 
large number of pervasive smart ob-
jects will observe the movements and 
actions of all people involved and 
check them according to predefined 
patterns.1 These smart devices are om-
nipresent, but they are disappearing at 
the same time – they become invisible 
to the user (cf. Weiser 1991). In future 
no human being will be forced to op-
erate a computer interface any more 
(like a computer keyboard, a touch pad 
or any adjusting lever e.g. for the cen-
tral heating), because all the smart 
objects around observe their environ-
ment and act according to pre-pro-
grammed routines, e.g. switching on 
the light when you enter the room. 
However, many proponents of smart 
technology also have identified con-
siderable risks, since smart objects 
allow for an identification and localisa-
tion of mobile objects and people, thus 
raising questions about data protec-
tion as well as about abuse of these 
systems for surveillance by totalitarian 
organizations (Mattern 2003: 14). This 
conflict seems to be irresolvable, be-
                                                       
1 The basic underlying technology is Radio 
Frequency Identification (RFID), i.e. the 
equipment of people and objects with 
transponders that submit all relevant data 
needed to identify and to track a person; cf. 
Locquenghien 2006. 
cause if you strengthen data protection 
by inhibiting the hidden exchange of 
data, the performance and the effi-
ciency of the systems will diminish and 
vice versa. 
Mattern points at a large number of 
unresolved questions, which – accord-
ing to his opinion – have to be solved 
urgently, if modern societies want to 
exploit the potentials of the new tech-
nology. One cause of concern is the 
possible loss of control, if smart ob-
jects become disloyal. Another ques-
tion is the degree of autonomy of 
smart objects. A further serious prob-
lem is the erosion of trust, which 
emerges for example by dynamic pric-
ing in the internet or by the dynamic 
adjustment of the (mostly) virtual envi-
ronment (cf. Skiera 2000, Mattern 
2003, TA-Swiss 2003b).2 Trust is a cen-
tral feature of modern societies, be-
cause – as Uwe Schimank argues 
(1992) – strategic actors can only exe-
cute goal-oriented action if there is at 
least some sort of certainty of expecta-
tion, i.e. a (mutual) expectation that 
other actors will behave in a predict-
able way that has emerged as a result 
of previous actions and interactions. 
Furthermore said certainty of expecta-
tion allows for individual and organ-
izational learning and thus is – in addi-
tion with goal-oriented action – one 
major precondition for societal devel-
opment. In a world without trust social 
relations will erode and societal devel-
opment will slow down or even grind 
to a halt. 
In a world of smart, adaptive things 
the objects are no longer stable and 
resistant, but soft and fleeting (cf. 
Hubig 2003). This may result in a 
number of severe consequences for 
                                                       
2 Mattern (2003) and others such as Lang-
heinrich (2003) discuss the option of a 
virtual memory which helps finding a path 
through the real world by providing infor-
mation about the objects. If each object 
has its own website, the "identity" of the 
objects as well as the – virtual – reality we 
are living in, may change frequently and 
may be manipulated easily. 
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human action, because individual (as 
well as societal) learning is only possi-
ble, if you can fail when acting strate-
gically. According to Hubig, in a smart 
world that constantly changes people 
are hindered to act strategically, be-
cause strategic action implies to take 
into consideration the boundary con-
ditions of action (the world outside as 
well as the presumptive actions of 
other actors), to calculate the probabil-
ity of success and failure, and subse-
quently, to adjust the strategy accord-
ing to the result of the action. 
Hubig and other critics of pervasive 
computing thus emphasize the decon-
struction of the traditional order of 
social life, which has been triggered by 
the introduction of smart technology. 
Intelligent systems, as described 
above, prevent human actors from 
acting strategically and from learning 
that way because they try to avoid 
situations in which the individual can 
fail (and learn) – by presenting or 
rather constructing a "perfect" world 
that shows up according to the sys-
tem's rules, the user does neither 
know nor understand. 
2.2 Distributed systems 
In order to grasp the capacity of smart 
systems it is necessary to understand 
the sources of their performance, 
which differ significantly from previous 
systems e.g. in automation technology 
insofar as agency is constituted by the 
cooperation of distributed compo-
nents. 
Smart systems typically consist of net-
works of embedded computers, which 
are equipped with sensors and com-
munication devices in order to collect 
data and communicate them to other 
components of the system (cf. Mattern 
2003). The singular components of 
these systems are not intelligent, at 
least when regarded from the point of 
view of traditional artificial intelligence 
(AI) research. They are rather stupid 
because of lacking computer power as 
well as missing capabilities to over-
view the whole situation. The single 
device doesn't have global information, 
but the network of "smart" object may 
develop a remarkable problem-solving 
capability. 
In the last decades the traditional no-
tion of intelligence which mainly fo-
cuses on the cognitive capacities and 
human-like properties of a machine 
has been replaced by a new concept of 
intelligence which focuses on the 
problem-solving capacities of com-
puter systems or rather multi-agent 
systems ("practical intelligence"). This 
paradigm shift has among others been 
promoted by Rodney Brooks. In his 
book "Flesh and Machines" (2002) he 
describes his unsuccessful attempts to 
program a robot that could manoeuvre 
safely through a building, avoiding 
collisions with people and objects. All 
attempts to take into consideration, 
according to the model of anticipative 
planning, every possible situation and 
to supply the machine with a software-
based routine to cope with these situa-
tions, failed as Brooks shows in his 
description. It is the simple changes of 
light and shadow during the course of 
the day that raise unsolvable problems 
to a robot of this type (Brooks 2002: 
39pp., 52). Every conceivable constel-
lation had to be put down in the mem-
ory of the central processor, and it 
would take several minutes to calcu-
late one single step of the robot. In 
fact this device would be incapable of 
solving very simple tasks. 
Therefore 20 years ago the idea came 
up to do without a central processor, 
to distribute "intelligence" among the 
different parts ("agents") of a machine 
and to combine these parts into a 
multi-agent system (MAS). The singu-
lar agents only have little computer 
power, but they can act autonomously 
according to their simple internal 
rules, and – the most innovative fea-
ture – they can monitor their environ-
ment and thus contribute to a behav-
iour of the entire system that can be 
described as adaptive. A MAS robot 
can very easily move through a build-
ing only complying with simple rules 
132 STI Studies 2006: 127-149 
 
of movement and collision avoidance. 
It is rather the coupling of a number of 
simple, decentralized agents and not 
the superior "intelligence" of a central-
ized brain that makes these systems so 
powerful. "Intelligence" thus appears 
as an emergent feature of the network 
(and its coordinating activities) and 
not as a given property of the elements 
(also cf. Weiser 1991: 72). MAS systems 
can act in real time and they can adapt 
to their environment. Brooks created 
small insect-like machines which 
moved around with an astonishing 
agility and thus contributed to the 
emergence of the new research field of 
"Artifical life", because the behaviour of 
the machines resembled living organ-
isms. Above all: The performance of 
MAS was much better than the per-
formance of classical robots con-
structed by referring to the traditional, 
"cognitive" AI paradigm (also cf. 
Christaller 2001). 
Since then the idea has gained ground 
in different sectors of society (e.g. 
transportation or aviation) that decen-
tralized systems of distributed agents 
can perform better and help to avoid 
risks (cf. chapter 3). 
2.3 The question of agency 
Promoted by Brooks and others, dur-
ing the last 20 years a new generation 
of technology has emerged, which can 
be categorized – according to Werner 
Rammert and Ingo Schulz-Schaeffer 
(2002) – as interactive, intelligent and 
adaptive. This results in implications 
for the interaction of man and ma-
chine, since the traditional instrumen-
tal notion of technology no longer 
applies, if technological devices gain 
the capability of autonomous decision 
making. Thus, from a sociological 
point of view the question of agency of 
objects arises. 
Rammert and Schulz-Schaeffer have 
made an attempt to answer this ques-
tion in a way that goes beyond the 
symmetrical ontology of Bruno Latour 
(1996, 1998). They raise the question 
of how technology studies shall deal 
with technical objects, which behave 
and interact in a way that resembles 
social interaction (Rammert/Schulz-
Schaeffer 2002: 16).3 
There are more and more technical 
systems where intelligent agents assist 
or substitute the human decision 
maker (e.g. in modern airplanes, trains 
or cars, cf. Timpe 2002). The behaviour 
of a car which brakes automatically in 
case of danger looks very similar to the 
behaviour of a car where the action 
has been taken by a human controller. 
In many instances we are unable (from 
an outside point of view) to distinguish 
human action from non-human action, 
because the system's behaviour is al-
most identical. It can only be said, the 
socio-technical system, consisting of 
the driver, the brake assistant and 
other devices, has performed in a way 
that usually is described as an action, 
which is based on a decision. Thus, 
people attribute a more or less strate-
gic behaviour even to non-human 
agents and technical objects, if they 
behave in a way that resembles human 
action (cf. Brooks 2002: 56). 
Rammert's and Schulz-Schaeffer's con-
struct a model of "distributed agency 
between people and objects" (2002: 
21), which distinguishes different lev-
els of "agency" that can be achieved 
either by human actors or by technical 
agents (43-50): 
• causality: the ability to trigger 
changes, 
• contingency: the capability to act 
in a different way (i.e. choosing al-
ternatives), 
• intentionality: the ability to control 
and to give meaning to the given 
behaviour. 
At the first level there are almost no 
differences between men and ma-
                                                       
3 Bruno Latour never dealt with smart ob-
jects, but with representatives of a tech-
nology that can also be understood by 
using the traditional instrumental notion of 
technology, such as key tags or speed 
bumps; cf. Rammert 2003. 
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chines. A dish washer can do its job at 
least as good as the well-behaved hus-
band. However, to meet the decision 
which kind of dishes may be put into 
the dish washer (second level), re-
quires some sort of advanced technol-
ogy which can for example distinguish 
different material. Bid assistants at 
electronic market places or autopilots 
in modern planes obviously can be 
subsumed to this category. 
The third level is the most complicated 
one. Rammert/Schulz-Schaeffer avoid 
a final statement (e.g. on ontological 
issues) and call for an observation of 
the societal practices of attribution of 
intentionality to either people or ob-
jects instead (47). They argue that in-
tentionality is not a natural ingredient 
of human action, but mostly a product 
of processes of interpretation and at-
tribution. Human beings are used to 
suppose that someone who acts in the 
way he acts, has done so because he 
intended to do so. But nobody really 
knows, if this assumption of rational 
decision making is true. The same 
could even apply to machines. Today 
we still are not used to assume that a 
brake assistant acts intentionally, but – 
according to Rammert/Schulz-Schaef-
fer – this is a societal practise we 
should reflect about and not a fixed 
ontological fact. 
Rammert/Schulz-Schaeffer have 
sketched a new framework that helps 
to better understand the roles, actors 
and agents can play in hybrid systems. 
However, some questions remain. First 
they do not deal with the interaction of 
actors and agents as well as the emer-
gence of social order out of this inter-
action. Their model just integrates 
non-humans into a framework of 
agency, which obviously is guided by 
the concept of equality in character of 
human actors and non-human agents. 
This implies that sociology can con-
struct agent societies according to the 
rules of human societies, taking a 
similarity of actors and agents for 
granted. 
Second – as a kind of consequence of 
the first issue – from their point of 
view the interaction of a human with 
other humans cannot systematically be 
differentiated from the interaction of a 
human with non-humans.4 Rammert/ 
Schulz-Schaeffer thus cannot put for-
ward the question, if different types of 
systems and even new types of social 
order emerge from these different 
kinds of interaction. They confine 
themselves to the micro-level of 
agency, which is important without 
doubt. However, since they do not 
treat the problem of social order, they 
also do not deal with the question, if 
these new types of hybrid systems are 
feasible or even desirable. 
Finally Rammert/Schulz-Schaeffer do 
not care about the consequences or 
risks of hybrid systems and their diffu-
sion in society. Instead, they call for a 
new approach, which explores the 
broad variety of distributed agency 
open-mindedly. Their model thus can 
be regarded as a neutral point of view 
which does not care about possible 
societal risks of hybrid systems, as put 
forward by the authors quoted in 
chapter 2.1. 
2.4 A new mode of governance? 
A more sceptical, pessimistic view is 
taken by Gene Rochlin, who summa-
rizes the experiences already made by 
implementing agent systems in differ-
ent sectors of society. In his book 
"Trapped in the Net" (1998) Rochlin 
discusses the "unanticipated conse-
quences of computerization" (subtitle 
of the book), which is – to start with 
the conclusion – a fundamental trans-
formation of society. His argumenta-
                                                       
4 The still open question, if one should 
apply the terms "interaction" or "coopera-
tion" even to machines, can be answered 
here, referring to Rammert (2003: 297), as 
follows: if technology can change its be-
haviour according to the given situation – 
which is level two of the scheme presented 
above – then it might appropriate to use 
this term. This concept differs deeply from 
Latour, who attributes agency to every kind 
of (technical or natural) object. 
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tion is based on a number of case 
studies on the informating of labour, 
the management of organizations, 
computer trading, the automatisation 
of high reliability systems and, finally, 
on different instances of the imple-
mentation of smart technology in the 
field of the military. His main argu-
ment is that in history we can observe 
a sequence of modes of management 
of organizations as follows (7p.): 
• Hierarchical, centralized control 
and rational planning (core tech-
nology: mainframe computers, pe-
riod of time: 1950s and 1960s), 
• flexible, decentralized self-organi-
zation (core technology: personal 
computer, period of time: 1970s 
and 1980s), 
• central control of decentralized 
structures by means of networking 
(core technology: networking of 
heterogeneous, distributed sys-
tems, e.g. via the internet, period of 
time: since the 1990s).5 
Rochlin's book deals with the apparent 
paradox that in the third mode (mode 
C) the networking of autonomous ele-
ments eventually ends up with a total 
control and loss of autonomy. Road 
traffic is a good example to illustrate 
this recent paradigm shift (cf. Spehr 
2006): in a first step the singular cars 
could improve their performance by 
adding electronic assistants such as 
the navigation system, which largely 
increased the autonomy of the drivers, 
e.g. in finding an alternative route in 
case of congestion (mode B). As soon 
as cars become "knots in the net" (TA-
Swiss 2003a: 2) which communicate 
all relevant data bidirectional, a re-
centralization and a redistribution of 
authority takes place (mode C), which 
in principal gives way even to visionary 
concepts of the remote control of road 
traffic, e.g. in order to avoid negative 
effects such as congestions (cf. TA-
                                                       
5 In the following the paper will refer to 
these three stages as "mode A", "mode B" 
and "mode C" (cf. chart 3 on page 144). 
Swiss 2003a, Weyer 2006a). This would 
imply far-reaching interventions from 
outside and an almost total loss of 
control on the side of the drivers. 
Referring to this partly foreseeable, 
partly even realized change of the sys-
tem's architecture and its control logic, 
Rochlin uses the term "computer trap" 
(217) to point at the unintended and 
unpredicted consequences of the im-
plementation of smart technical de-
vices. His main concerns are the fore-
seeable risks of this development such 
as the deconstruction of social institu-
tions (56, 208p.) and the growing vul-
nerability and dependency of society 
on a kind of technology which can 
hardly be controlled, but entails un-
predictable risks (11, 14, 106, 186). 
One would obviously misinterpret 
Rochlin, if one relates these negative 
impacts to the character of the tech-
nology and nothing else. Rochlin in-
sists that it is the striving for a perma-
nent improvement of efficiency (and 
the utilization of computer networks to 
achieve this objective) which causes a 
development that eventually ends up 
with a standardization of processes 
and a subordination of decentralized 
systems under a central plan (as e.g. in 
the case of inventory or data ware-
house systems). The technological 
foundation of this type of systems, 
which operates in a mode of central, 
anticipative control, is the electronic 
networking and integration of num-
bers of elements in real time (mode C). 
Rochlin uses the term "micro-manage-
ment" (149, cf. 63), to indicate a strat-
egy of vertical coordination, which 
intervenes directly at any level by 
means of advanced IT devices, thus 
governing every process in the whole 
organization. Rochlin also hints at the 
risks of such a development, which are 
a loss of autonomy and "slack" (63, 
213) – i.e. the ability to react to unex-
pected situations flexibly – as well as 
"the potential losses of social means 
for learning, social capacity for adapta-
tion, and social space for innovation 
and creativity" (213). 
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Rochlin apparently is a promoter of 
decentralized self-coordination (mode 
B). He argues that systems of this type 
are able to cope with unexpected 
situations, because the members of the 
organization are well-trained in crisis 
management (cf. Rochlin 1991, La-
Porte/Consolini 1991, Krücken/Weyer 
1999). Every measure that transfers the 
decision-making authority to a central 
control body therefore entails the risk 
of a fatal error, because the design of a 
centralized system may entail errors, 
which finally inhibit the participants to 
act according to the concrete opera-
tional needs in a given emergency 
situation. 
To summarize Rochlin's argument: The 
new type of smart technology facili-
tates the emergence of a new mode of 
governance of complex systems, which 
goes beyond the well-known types of 
central control and decentralised self-
coordination. "Intelligent" systems give 
rise to the capability to execute some 
kind of central control of decentralised 
systems (mode C), since smart devices 
can collect large amount of data about 
the world and the people and integrate 
them – by networking – into a unique 
control architecture. 
2.5 Summary 
If we compare the concept of Ram-
mert/Schulz-Schaffer with the ap-
proach of Rochlin, the divergences are 
obvious. Rammert/Schulz-Schaeffer 
have constructed a model for an unbi-
ased analysis of hybrid systems (with 
distributed agency) which still lacks 
empirical evidence and is open-minded 
concerning the results of future devel-
opment. Rochlin, on the other hand, 
does not take much care of theoretical 
questions of agency, but has analysed 
a number of cases of the informating 
of society which give evidence to the 
assumption that networks of pervasive 
smart devices may lead to totalitarian 
systems of central control which even-
tually end up with a fundamental 
transformation of society. 
Up to now the debate has been unre-
solved and the two approaches have 
not yet been conciliated. But we can 
take this controversy as a starting 
point for the analysis of the case study 
on TCAS (cf. chapter 3). This case shall 
help to discuss the issue of distributed 
agency on the one hand and the topic 
of governance of hybrid systems on 
the other. It will show that the tradi-
tional, hierarchical order of aviation 
(mode A) has been deconstructed by 
the implementation of innovative tech-
nological systems, leading to a reor-
ganization of air traffic control and an 
introduction of another mode of gov-
ernance (mode B), which, however, 
entails some previously unknown 
risks. Therefore the question will be 
discussed, if the new regime of decen-
tralized self-organization in aviation, 
which is facilitated by TCAS, can guar-
antee the same level of safety as the 
old hierarchical system of centralized 
control. The following chapter 4 will 
take a look at future developments 
beyond TCAS that may lead to new 
combinations of governance modes 
(mode C). 
 
3 Case Study TCAS 
In the following section a case study 
on the Traffic Alert and Collision 
Avoidance System (TCAS) will be pre-
sented, which explores the operational 
logic of a hybrid system, discusses the 
challenges and risks and raises some – 
tentative – questions about different 
control logics and system architec-
tures. The experiences, which have 
been gathered with the interaction of 
human actors and non-human agents 
in TCAS guided aircraft during the last 
ten years, are being interpreted in the 
following as a part of the effort to cre-
ate a new type of socio-technical order 
in hybrid systems. 
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3.1 History and operational logic of 
TCAS 
TCAS is an airborne short-range colli-
sion avoidance system which is man-
datory equipment of modern passen-
ger aircraft in the U.S. since 1994 and 
in the European Union since 2000 
(Denke 2001, Nordwall 2002). Its pur-
pose is to prevent aircraft from midair 
collision by warning the pilot when 
another plane is in a predefined range 
of about six kilometres (which is about 
40 seconds flight time, cf. chart 1). 
This is especially important at night or 
when weather conditions are bad.6 
If a TCAS system detects a conflict 
situation it warns the pilot ("traffic 
advisory") and some seconds later is-
sues commands to climb or to descend 
("resolution advisory"). If both aircraft 
which are part of the conflict are 
equipped with TCAS "they will commu-
nicate to avoid mirror-image manoeu-
vres" (Nordwall 2002). 
TCAS thus can be regarded as a dis-
tributed system where two (or even 
three) agents "communicate inten-
tions" (Nordwall 2002) and coordinate 
their actions autonomously. Even if 
                                                       
6 For more details see VC 1997, BFU 2004. 
the pilot finally takes the action, the 
proposal to act is generated by a set of 
communicating agents. TCAS is a 
"foolproof" system, and pilots "have a 
high regard" (Nordwall 2002) for this 
device (cf. also VC 1997). Nevertheless 
TCAS has been one cause among oth-
ers in the midair collision of a Russian 
Tupolew Tu154M and a DHL cargo 
Boeing B757-200 on July 1, 2002 over 
the Bodensee in southern Germany, 
killing all 71 passengers aboard. Both 
aircraft had been equipped with the 
latest version of TCAS.7 
Before describing the chain of events 
that led to the disaster, it is necessary 
to understand the role TCAS plays in 
the overall system of aviation safety. 
3.2 ATC or TCAS? 
The well established system whose 
task is to avoid accidents in aviation is 
the ground based air traffic control 
(ATC). ATC centres are equipped with 
modern devices – mostly redundant – 
to detect airplanes far away. They have 
                                                       
7 The recent midair collision in Brazil on 
September 29, 2006 might also partly be 
caused by a malfunctioning TCAS or a gap 
in the system which arises from the invisi-
bility of a plane that has switched off its 
transponder; cf. Fiorino 2006. 
 
Chart 1: TCAS – Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System 
(souce: Mensen 2004: 374) 
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global information of schedules and 
current traffic on different flight levels. 
Moreover they can communicate with 
the airplanes by radio telephony but 
also by asking the transponders of the 
planes to communicate all relevant 
data. So in an ideal situation the ATC 
has complete information. The ATC 
system is a typical example of a hierar-
chical, centrally controlled system 
which in principle is able – referring to 
Perrow (1984) – to guarantee a high 
degree of safety. 
However, since the 1960s an alterna-
tive safety system has been developed 
which functions according to a very 
different logic, which is decentralized 
coordination. TCAS creates a commu-
nication link between two (or more) 
aircraft and so can avoid collisions 
independently of the ATC ground con-
trol. It is obvious that this system can 
only work reliable, if every aircraft is 
being equipped with (at least similar) 
TCAS devices. And it generates ques-
tions about the co-ordination of ATC 
and TCAS which can be answered in 
different ways – either replacing the 
ground control by an independent sys-
tem or finding reliable ways of coop-
eration of the two systems. One cause 
of the Ueberlingen accident is the fact 
that different aviation communities 
had generated different answers to this 
question. 
The U.S. Standard Operation Proce-
dures (SOPs) 
In the U.S. as well as in Europe TCAS is 
being regarded as an additional short-
range "safety net" (VC 1997) that only 
issues warnings if the ATC systems 
already has failed (Nordwall 2002). 
Pilots are being trained to rely on TCAS 
and to obey its commands strictly in a 
case of emergency – especially con-
cerning the fact that in these situations 
there remain only a very few seconds 
to react properly. U.S. pilots are used 
to ignore the commands of ground 
controllers, because they are aware of 
the fact that in such a critical situation 
the ATC has imperfect knowledge, 
since the (decentralised) TCAS systems 
are not designed to communicate their 
data to the ATC computer. 
U.S. pilots rely on TCAS even if they 
know that this system has some short-
comings. In the U.S. TCAS had only 
been mandatory for passenger aircraft 
with more than 30 seats, whereas the 
European Union had put the limit to a 
weight of 15 metric tons.8 Every pilot 
flying a TCAS-equipped aircraft there-
fore must be aware of the fact that 
there may be some other aircraft, e.g. 
military or small planes, in the vicinity 
which are invisible to him (VC 1997). 
The Russian Standard Operation Pro-
cedures 
The Russian SOPs concerning TCAS 
are very different, since they distrust 
the system because of its well-known 
limitations and pitfalls. The Russian 
logic to cope with situations of conflict 
between ATC and TCAS was very sim-
ple: "In Russia pilots will take ATC's 
orders over the instructions of any 
onboard navigational system." (Venik 
2002, emphasis added) Besides the 
invisibility of some sort of aircraft the 
reason is, that ATC has "a complete 
picture of the sky" (ibd.) which is based 
on redundant systems (TCAS is not 
redundant). Obviously there is some 
confusion in the skies and a conflict 
between different safety cultures. This 
confusion is partly due to the fact, that 
the two safety systems are not inter-
connected. There is no feedback that 
informs the ground controller of the 
recommendations given by TCAS to the 
pilots. Such a feedback obviously 
would help to improve the system's 
performance and avoid opposing 
commands. In the current state the 
conflict must be resolved by the lonely 
pilot who has to decide – in a very 
short period of time – to ignore one of 
the two safety measures the original 
                                                       
8 These rules have been changed and inter-
nationally harmonized in 2003 (17 metric 
tons) and again in 2005 (5.7 metric tons, cf. 
Mensen 2004: 375). 
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intention of which had been to in-
crease air transportation safety (cf. 
Venik 2002). And he takes the full re-
sponsibility for his actions – a typical 
pitfall of automation which apparently 
cannot substitute for human decision 
making, but creates situations of hu-
man decision making which are much 
more difficult to solve than before. 
However, the confusion is also partly 
due to the incompatible operational 
logics of the two systems: Either you 
rely on central control and put the 
responsibility on the controller, who 
organizes the system's performance by 
hierarchical governance, or you rely on 
the problem-solving capacity of decen-
tralized self-organization and distrib-
ute responsibility within the system. 
But you cannot do both at once. We'll 
come back to this question later. 
Now it is easier to understand the Ue-
berlingen crash, because the crew of 
the DHL cargo Boeing followed the 
U.S. SOPs, to obey strictly TCAS, while 
the crew of the Russian Tupolew was 
divided on the question which proce-
dure to follow and finally adopted the 
Russian way which urged them to rely 
on the ground controller and to ne-
glect the recommendation of the TCAS, 
which unhappily was exactly the oppo-
site. This conflict, however, could have 
been resolved, if there had not been an 
unfortunate concatenation of events 
which contributed to the dramatics of 
the situation. 
3.3 The Mid-Air Collision at Ueber-
lingen 
The two planes crashed at July 1, 2002 
at 23:35:32 at flight level FL 360, which 
is a height of about 11.000 meters. 
Both planes had been guided by the 
ATC at Zurich (Switzerland) where only 
one controller was on active duty. He 
had taken over the two planes only a 
few minutes before, but did only real-
ize the conflict 43 seconds before the 
collision. When he issued his warn-
ings, the TCAS systems of the two air-
craft had already automatically gener-
ated their recommendations (TAs and 
RAs), and the tragedy was that he 
urged the Russian crew to descend – 
which was exactly the contrary of the 
TCAS recommendation (cf. chart 2). 
Additionally an instructor, who was 
not familiar with the TCAS system, had 
taken over the role of the pilot in 
command (PIC) in the Russian plane, 
while the other pilot – in normal situa-
tions the commander – acted as the 
pilot flying (PF). After the contrary rec-
ommendations had been issued the 
crew was not only confused about the 
facts but also had to cope with author-
 Chart 2: The Mid-Air Collision at Ueberlingen 
 (source: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 20.07.2002: 7) 
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ity and coordination problems, since 
the PIC demanded to comply with the 
commands issued by the ATC, while 
the PF insisted on relying on TCAS. The 
rearrangement of the crew (at a night 
flight!) and the missing comprehension 
of the TCAS system on part of the in-
structor were major causes of the sub-
sequent mistake. So the question 
arises: Was it simply a human error? 
Similar to other cases of highly auto-
mated systems, modern aircraft are 
also conducted by people, the main 
task of which is to monitor the sys-
tem's operating in the routine mode, 
were nothing happens for hours and 
hours. Additionally modern techno-
logical systems are designed to prevent 
the emergency case, which mostly 
works very well – but with the conse-
quence that unforeseen situations oc-
cur only very rarely and can hardly be 
trained systematically. As in other 
cases, the investigation of the Ueber-
lingen crash revealed that the operat-
ing procedures for TCAS, issued by the 
International Civil Aviation Organiza-
tion (ICAO), were confusing and incon-
sistent (BFU 2004: 4, 7). At least the 
Russian crew was not familiar with the 
system and had only little experience 
with it. 
However, if we take a look at the or-
ganization of Skyguide, the operator of 
the ATC Zurich, and the safety culture 
of this organization we will find some 
more factors which contributed to the 
disaster: 
In that night there had been mainte-
nance works at the ATC, which re-
quired to partially shut down the radar 
system. As a consequence the Short 
Term Conflict Alert (STCA) system – a 
ground based pendant to TCAS – 
which warns the controller of an up-
coming conflict constellation, was only 
partly operating, i.e. it could not pre-
sent the information optically on the 
screen. However, the controller was 
not aware of this. Generally, no one at 
Skyguide knew exactly which effects 
the maintenance works had on the 
overall performance of the ATC Zurich. 
For example the telephone line was 
out of duty for a few minutes. Evi-
dently there was no awareness that 
this constellation with a coincide of 
uncommon events raises the risk and 
the probability of errors. One possible 
consequence might have been that the 
informal practise of a one-man-opera-
tion had been abandoned that night. 
During the critical period of time (from 
23:30 to 23:35) the attention of the 
unfortunate controller, who later was 
murdered by a relative of one Russian 
victim, was distracted by a third air-
craft, approaching the nearby airport 
of Friedrichshafen, he had to guide, 
too, working at two desks simultane-
ously at different radio frequencies. A 
colleague at Karlsruhe airport who 
also observed the scene and had been 
alerted by his STCA, could not reach 
him by phone because the lines were 
out of duty exactly at that moment. 
(Remember: The STCA at Zurich airport 
could not issue an optical warning at 
that time.) Therefore the controller at 
Zurich only realized the conflict be-
tween the Boeing and the Tupolew a 
few seconds before the crash. He had 
to switch abruptly from the routine to 
the emergency mode (cf. LaPorte/Con-
solini 1991), but it was too late to find 
a proper solution because of the paral-
lel working – above described – of two 
badly coordinated control systems 
working with opposite operation lo-
gics. He suddenly was heavily under 
pressure and made a number of mis-
takes: He didn't understand a radio 
message of the Boeing crew properly 
(partly because of several simultane-
ous messages at the two desks), and 
he didn't register the acoustic STCA 
warning. 
Again: Was it a human error? Or or-
ganizational failure (at Skyguide as 
well as in the cockpit of the Tupolew)? 
Or was it a system's failure – a failure 
of a system that must fail because of 
complexity, of tight coupling, of lax 
safety cultures with a lacking aware-
ness for risky constellations, and fi-
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nally of unavoidable inattentiveness in 
boring night shifts in highly automated 
facilities and systems? 
The following chapter will not deal 
with these questions in detail, because 
they can be treated in the framework 
of the traditional automation debate 
(cf. Weyer 1997). It will instead pitch 
on only one of the multitude of causes 
of the midair collision: the coexistence 
of two contradictory governance 
modes as well as the role of smart 
technology. Thus the question can be 
put forward, which governance mode 
is best suited to manage the risks of 
complex systems. 
 
4 Creating order in hybrid systems 
4.1 Smart systems 
Modern aviation obviously is a good 
example for the omnipresence of em-
bedded, sensor-equipped computers, 
which automatically and increasingly 
autonomously operate in the back-
ground, achieve a remarkable prob-
lem-solving capability by networking 
and generate solutions by the interac-
tion of non-humans. Although it is 
only a quote from literature, the im-
pression that TCAS systems "commu-
nicate intentions" (Nordwall 2002, em-
phasis added) refers to the fact that 
something is happening in aviation 
that comes close to the kind of relation 
we are used to attribute only to hu-
mans up to now. Many of the features 
of "pervasive computing" apply, even if 
the voluminous and costly TCAS sys-
tem cannot be compared with a simple 
RFID chip, and well-trained profes-
sionals as e.g. pilots behave differently 
than non-trained people in everyday 
life. 
However, the TCAS case showed that 
even in a professional environment 
smart technology may lead to some 
confusion and a loss of learning capa-
bility, since new uncertainties arise 
that cannot be solved by learned rou-
tines. Often it is difficult for pilots to 
really understand what happens, and it 
is equally difficult to learn by experi-
ence how TCAS works in an unfore-
seen situation. Steering a modern air-
plane means to totally rely on techni-
cal devices which construct a virtual 
picture of the sky that is hardly distin-
guishable from a computer game as 
e.g. "Flight Simulator" from Microsoft.9 
Aviation has gained a high level of 
safety, but with every innovative tech-
nology new, uncommon risks arise. 
Finally attitudes have changed, since 
pilots' behaviour more and more can 
be described as adaptive rather than 
strategic (cf. Weyer 2006b): even 
though the pilot sees the intruder on 
the screen in advance, he is not forced 
to develop an evasion strategy (if he 
relies on TCAS), but he can calmly wait 
for the advisory automatically gener-
ated by the interacting TCAS systems. 
It is almost impossible to guess in ad-
vance if the recommendation will be 
"climb" or "sink", because this depends 
on a whole string of factors (among 
others the rank of the IDs of the com-
municating TCAS computers) the pilot 
can hardy determine let alone assess. 
The interaction of TCAS and the pilot 
thus resembles more a stimulus-
response-model than the traditional 
concept of strategic (inter-)action. 
As a result the debate on "pervasive 
computing" points out to be a valuable 
context for the analysis of modern 
aviation. 
4.2 The risks of distributed agency 
Aviation can also be regarded as a hy-
brid system of distributed agency. This 
applies to the meso-level of air traffic 
control as well as the micro-level of 
the cockpit. In the latter the (human) 
pilots and a number of (non-human) 
assistance systems such as TCAS work 
together in finding a solution to a 
given situation: TCAS takes the re-
sponsibility for the definition of the 
situation, the interaction with the 
other plane as well as the recommen-
                                                       
9 Personal communication Burkhard Kruse 
(Lufthansa) April 7, 2005. 
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dation of action to the pilot (in a hu-
man-like manner of oral speech), 
whereas the pilot is in charge for car-
rying out of the action and the super-
vising and evaluating the whole system 
(including the meta-decision to rely on 
TCAS). In many regards smart technol-
ogy substitutes human actors and 
"acts" autonomously (e.g. in finding an 
agreement with the other plane – pre-
viously the task of the human control-
ler), but the complete action to evade a 
critical situation is taken by a hybrid 
set of human actors and non-human 
agents, both of whom are responsible 
for different sequences of the action 
chain (cf. Rammert/Schulz-Schaeffer 
2002). 
As far as that goes hybrid systems with 
distributed agency are a continuation 
of the well-known path of automation, 
and they share the risks of many other 
highly automated systems. At the same 
time the participation of autonomous 
technology in decision-making proc-
esses contributes to an intensification 
of problems and risks. Operating a 
plane is routine work with boring 
monitoring duties that leads to a low 
level of attention and awareness of 
risks – especially in systems regarded 
as self-controlling and inherently safe. 
In those rare cases of emergency, 
which mostly take the operators by 
surprise, an unexpected interaction of 
system's components produces a 
situation which is only partly under-
stood and which can only hardly be 
managed – especially under time pres-
sure, as the Ueberlingen case showed. 
However, in an emergency situation 
the operators suddenly find them-
selves in a situation where they have 
to take the responsibility to control the 
facility (including a number of smart 
devices). This implies to make very 
difficult decisions, which emerge be-
cause of unfamiliar and previously 
unknown uncertainties. To some re-
gard we can talk of a dramatization of 
the well-known automation paradox: 
the re-entry of the human decision 
maker, which had been excluded from 
making first-order-decisions (steering 
the plane on a climbing or descending 
path) and now has to make second-
order-decisions, i.e. determine if the 
automation device gives the correct 
advice or not and if he can rely on its 
recommendation to climb or to de-
scend. 
Hybrid systems of distributed agency 
tend to intensify the over-reliance on 
technology, which increases risks 
solely by the invisibility of the proc-
esses and the enormous time pressure. 
Additionally hybrid systems, which 
allow for autonomous action of tech-
nology and aim at a "perfect" control of 
the world, run the risk of a loss of 
competence on the part of the opera-
tors, since they try to avoid situations 
in which the operator can gain experi-
ence and learn from experience. Dis-
tributed systems of the given type thus 
have an inherent tendency to turn into 
completely automated systems – with 
the human functioning only as a stop-
gap. 
4.3 A new mode of governance 
Moreover the case study has shown 
that the introduction of TCAS has trig-
gered the deconstruction of the estab-
lished order in aviation, leading to 
some confusion and irritation not only 
about the functioning of the device, 
but also about the rules which hold in 
the system. It is still an ongoing proc-
ess of social learning and experimen-
tation which uncovers the limits and 
pitfalls of the new system architecture. 
As in other cases of the introduction of 
a radically new technology, usually an 
experimentation period of some years 
is needed, until measures will have 
been generated to cope with unfore-
seen situations (cf. Krohn/Weyer 1994, 
Weyer 1997). However this process 
must also include the construction of 
new institutions, i.e. new modes of 
governance of hybrid systems, which 
will probably need a longer period of 
time. 
The implementation of TCAS thus can 
be regarded not only as the introduc-
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tion of a new device, but as a first step 
in a regime change, which may lead to 
a fundamental transformation of avia-
tion, since pilots now are able to re-
solve conflicts in the mode of decen-
tralized self-organization (cf. Deuten 
2003). The next step will be a com-
pletely self-coordination of the aircraft 
during the entire flight ("free-flight"), 
including autonomous routing and 
navigation, which has been developed 
in the U.S. as a successor of TCAS and 
is currently tested in daily flight opera-
tions in Australia (cf. Hughes/Mecham 
2004). 
At the moment pilots find themselves 
in a contradictory situation: their 
autonomy, i.e. their freedom to act 
towards the controller has grown, 
whereas their autonomy to fly the 
plane has diminished because of the 
substitution of many actions by smart 
technology. Despite these uncertain-
ties and only partly determined role 
conflicts, the introduction of TCAS has 
started to establish a new order in 
aviation and a new mode of the gov-
ernance as well (mode B), which co-
exists beside the traditional mode of 
central control (mode A). This may be a 
cause of hardy resolvable conflicts, as 
the Ueberlingen case shows, because 
both modes follow a different opera-
tional logic: 
Centralized control 
In densely coupled traffic systems such 
as aviation or railway transportation 
the safety architecture mostly is based 
on the principle of global optimisation 
(cf. TA-Swiss 2003a). The governance 
structures are shaped by the top objec-
tive of overall system's safety, which is 
– for instance in civil aviation – real-
ized by giving strict orders to the par-
ticipants they have to obey. The con-
trol architecture intends to guarantee 
the system's performance and effi-
ciency (with a load factor as high as 
possible) as well as the safety of op-
erations (with an accident rate as low 
as possible). Social order thus is su-
perimposed in a top-down-manner by 
actors which have superior knowledge 
and are conducted by the goal of 
maintaining public welfare. Technol-
ogy serves as an instrument to monitor 
and to steer the participants of the 
system. 
Decentralized self-organization 
On the contrary the concept of decen-
tralized self-organization argues that 
endogenous processes within a given 
system lead to good and stable solu-
tions, which mostly cannot be attained 
by central control, since the external 
controller doesn't have the knowledge 
that the participants have. Modern 
technology such as TCAS enables the 
user to create solutions for current 
problems (such as optimizing the 
course or avoiding collisions) which 
are doubtlessly superior to the user 
who operates in a conventional man-
ner. The basic logic here is local opti-
misation, since the singular user 
mostly doesn't have global information 
and doesn't take care of the external 
effects of his actions, but optimises his 
performance regardless of the conse-
quences for other users as well as for 
the global system. Social order finally 
emerges in a bottom-up-manner as 
the unintended product of the interac-
tion of selfish actors. So this kind of 
local optimization doesn't need to end 
with a global maximum (cf. Epstein/ 
Axtell 1996: 13). 
However, if safety is at stake, the ar-
gument of the unpredictable emer-
gence of order can also be read from 
the opposite. Emergence also can im-
ply unforeseeable, undesirable behav-
iour, especially in the case of smart 
systems which are designed to act and 
evolve autonomously (cf. Resnick 
1995, Richter/Rost 2004). Air traffic 
controllers for example are reluctant to 
accept the new system architecture, 
because they do not believe that in the 
future system architecture of "free-
flight" a number of ten or more self-
coordinating pilots will be able to gen-
erate solutions with the same level of 
safety as in the traditional system, 
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where one person is in charge of the 
control of the entire system 
(Hughes/Mecham 2004: 50). This may 
indicate that we have only little knowl-
edge what happens if self-organized 
systems get out of control. 
The "double trap" 
In the present transition period be-
tween the old and the new regime, 
where two modes of governance co-
exist, a "double trap" appears: 
• On the one hand self-organizing 
systems are able to create innova-
tive solutions by own means and to 
generate emergent effects – a per-
formance which hardly can be pro-
duced by centralized systems. 
However, these effects are – ac-
cording to the concept of unin-
tended consequences (cf. Vanberg 
1975, Esser 1991) – unpredictable, 
which sometimes might also imply: 
undesirable and uncontrollable. 
Self-organizing systems may get 
out of control – with irreversible 
consequences –, and societies, 
which rely on them, do not have 
measures to recapture them.10 
• On the other hand a central control 
can integrate the system's elements 
and coordinate their behaviour in 
order to avoid or even eliminate 
undesirable or unintended effects 
of self-organization and to achieve 
a global optimum (e.g. safety and 
reliability). However, according to 
Rochlin (1998), this kind of control 
network may be inflexible and even 
endanger the sources of self-
organization and social learning. 
Thus, referring again to Rochlin's idea 
of a third mode, the question arises if 
other options exist which combine the 
advantages of those two modes (and 
help to avoid their shortcomings). 
Smart technology allows for different 
options and different combinations to 
                                                       
10 This may be partly due to the lacking 
theoretical understanding of the mecha-
nisms of self-organization, cf. Greshoff/ 
Schimank 2003, Richter/Rost 2004. 
be explored in future. These options 
will be discussed in the final paragraph 
of this chapter. 
4.4 Paths to future aviation 
The future of aviation – here locked 
upon as a sector, where hybrid sys-
tems advance – can be shaped in dif-
ferent ways, extending or restricting 
the capabilities of human actors and 
non-human agents, thus constructing 
different combinations and constella-
tions of hybrid systems (cf. chart 3). 
Complete decentralization 
One obvious option might be the com-
plete decentralization of aviation, 
based on a high level of electronic 
equipment on board of each plane, 
thus allowing for a decentralized self-
coordination in every phase of the 
flight – as well as a complete dissolu-
tion of ATC. (This is actually the "pur-
est" version of mode B.) When TCAS 
was invented in the 1970s this de-
tachment of the old system had indeed 
been the guiding vision of many engi-
neers (Venik 2002). Experiments with 
"free-flight" now carried out in lowly 
frequented areas in Australia show 
that this might be one path into the 
future of aviation. The single planes 
must be able to locate themselves pre-
cisely (via GPS) and communicate all 
relevant data to the ground station (via 
ADS-B11), but they do so simultane-
ously to other aircraft in a radius of 
250 km, thus allowing for a far-
reaching autonomous coordination 
without intervention of the controller 
(cf. Hughes/Mecham 2004, Hughes 
2005). The first time in the history of 
aviation the pilot has a complete pic-
ture of the sky. The task of ATC thus 
shifts from control to management and 
monitoring, while the pilot receives 
responsibility for navigation, coordina-
tion and separation – similar to the 
situation in the early days of aviation, 
but now on a high level of electronic 
assistance. 
                                                       
11 Automated Dependent Surveillance – 
Broadcast. 
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Forced automation 
However, a high level of equipment 
with smart devices could also lead to 
the complete displacement of the hu-
man decision maker in the cockpit 
(which stands for a major step towards 
mode C). In the early days of TCAS, the 
intention had been to directly transmit 
its commands to the autopilot, but 
these plans were dropped because of 
technical problems and a still low per-
formance of TCAS (Venik 2002). The 
present solution is a half-hearted 
compromise that leaves room to error, 
as the Ueberlingen case shows. Thus 
the next step could be to establish a 
direct link between TCAS and the 
autopilot in order to automatically 
navigate and avoid collisions without 
human intervention. Even if actually 
nobody in civil aviation puts forward 
this proposal, the unstoppable advance 
of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in 
military aviation indicates that this 
second path is also on the agenda to-
day (cf. Friese/Hein 2004).12 Experts 
believe that at least in cargo transport 
we will have unmanned planes in 
about ten years, and the cockpit crew 
of passenger planes will be reduced to 
only one pilot, who will work as an 
observer of a completely automated 
system.13 
However this strategy of automation 
totally relies on the autonomous ac-
tion of smart systems as well as their 
capabilities of decentralized coordina-
tion. This is a risk-taking strategy, be-
cause the extension of the area of 
automated decision making only im-
plies that the borderline between hu-
mans and machines is being moved. 
Especially in the case of mode selec-
tion someone has to identify, in which 
                                                       
12 The implementation of unmanned trans-
portation systems e.g. in the field of pas-
senger subways is another indication of 
this trend (cf. Wille 2004). 
13 Personal communication Karsten H. 
Severin (Bundesstelle für Flugunfallunter-
suchung - German Federal Bureau of Air-
craft Accidents Investigation) Oct. 20, 2005. 
Chart 3: Paths to Future Aviation 
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kind of situation (e.g. landing ap-
proach versus cruising) the system is 
currently operating, and take the deci-
sion to select the appropriate control 
mode. In partly automated systems the 
pilot is the decision maker, whereas in 
completely automated systems the 
decisions have been incorporated into 
the system's architecture (e.g. soft-
ware). In this case software engineers 
have to anticipate critical states in 
which the system shifts automatically 
to another mode. However, they are 
unable to check if this solution is ap-
propriate to the given situation, unless 
they learn from experience, namely by 
incidents or accidents.14 Even in com-
pletely automated systems human er-
ror is possible and even unavoidable – 
especially if we take into consideration 
that the decision maker now is a per-
son with no practical experience in 
flying planes (cf. Gras 1994, Weyer 
1997). 
Re-centralization 
To avoid these risks described, the 
strategy of forced automation in many 
cases is accompanied by a closer net-
working of the elements and a subse-
quent recentralization of authority – 
which marks another path to future 
aviation. As Rochlin warningly argues, 
there may be a novel option of the 
central control of decentralized sys-
tems (mode C, cf. chapter 2.4). This 
can be regarded as a combination of 
the two well-known modes of govern-
ance, since it relies on the problem-
solving capabilities of self-organiza-
tion, and simultaneously highly profits 
from the advantages of central control. 
Thus it promises to achieve a combi-
nation of flexibility and efficacy. Para-
doxically autonomous systems, which 
are effectively interconnected via net-
works, would allow for a recentraliza-
tion, i.e. a centralized remote control. 
Referring to the case of German rail-
                                                       
14 This is the reasons why accidents are – 
regarded from a methodological point of 
view – so worthy for application-oriented 
science; cf. Krohn/Weyer 1994. 
ways one could easily image all aircraft 
to be guided by one control centre – 
while the pilot on board would only 
monitor the system and manage those 
emergency cases which cannot be 
handled by the ground control. 
This scenario requires an effective 
means of self-control of the vehicle 
(via smart technology) and of self-
coordination within the system (e.g. 
for the purpose of collision avoidance) 
as well as real-time data communica-
tion with the centre, allowing also for 
effective intervention from outside. In 
this scenario the human operator 
would lose a great deal of his decision 
autonomy, whereas the control centre 
would gain force and the capacity to 
control the entire system. At the same 
time the control architecture described 
here decreases the capability of on-site 
crisis management by the operator, 
whose freedom to act is not only sub-
stituted by smart technical devices but 
also by the new governance mode of 
central control of a decentralized, net-
worked system. 
However, even in this case the problem 
of the effective distribution of authority 
remains unresolved, since two opera-
tional logics still co-exist in a way that 
may lead to confusion in a situation of 
crisis. Moreover, up to now we have 
only little experience with this new 
type of mixed governance. 
Improved coordination 
Therefore another path to a new order 
in aviation might be an improved co-
ordination of the two systems (e.g. ATC 
and TCAS), as repeatedly indicated in 
the case study. Until now both systems 
are only badly interconnected, because 
the recommendations which are gen-
erated by TCAS are not automatically 
communicated to the ground. (Pilots 
and controllers are used to communi-
cate via radio telephony instead, but 
this technology is rather trouble-prone 
and often insufficient in a crisis situa-
tion.) This missing link is due to the 
deliberations about the design of TCAS 
in the 1970s, where aircraft owners 
146 STI Studies 2006: 127-149 
 
were opposed to implement a more 
advanced, but also more costly version 
(cf. Deuten 2003: 233). So a cheaper, 
but also less efficient system came into 
being. Today it is possible to bridge the 
gap between TCAS and ATC with an 
automated data link, which will pro-
vide the control centre with complete 
information about the results of the 
decentralized coordination in the sky 
(thus establishing another variant of 
mode C). However, even if this data 
link will be installed overall in a few 
years, the authority conflict will re-
main, since both modes continue to 
exist side-by-side. So even if the tech-
nical problems will be resolved, the 
question of coordination of the two 
governance modes persists, especially 
the urgent issue, when to obey TCAS 
and when to listen to the ground con-
troller. 
Switch concepts 
One obvious option to cope with the 
problem of mixed governance is to 
create an organization which is able to 
operate in different modes and, addi-
tionally, is capable to switch between 
different modes according to the situa-
tion (again a specimen of mode C). 
This concept can be found in the lit-
erature on "high-reliability organiza-
tions" (HRO, cf. LaPorte/Consolini 
1991) as well as on "group interaction 
in high risk environments" (GIHRE, cf. 
Dietrich/Childress 2004). The central 
idea of both concepts is that organiza-
tions cannot be directed by only one 
mode of governance, since different 
situations (e.g. routine, emergency) 
require different responses. The mes-
sage is: successful organizations, 
which manage complex, highly auto-
mated systems with high risks, can 
guarantee safety, if they develop an 
organizational safety culture that is 
based on the ability to switch between 
different modes – as well as an intense 
and systematic training of all kind of 
situations in order to gain and main-
tain this capability to switch. That way 
HROs can successfully cope even with 
unforeseen crisis. 
As the TCAS case study showed, this 
idea may be a promising tool to ana-
lyse the governance of hybrid systems, 
too; future research will be necessary 
to explore the potential of this ap-
proach more deeply. However, it can 
already be assumed that the appropri-
ate distribution of responsibility and 
action capability between human ac-
tors and non-human agents as well as 
the development of a new institutional 
framework of interaction will be the 
core of an organization's ability to 
manage complex, hybrid systems. In 
the current situation different paths to 
the future of aviation are open. 
 
5 Conclusion 
As the case study on TCAS showed, 
currently a regime change takes place 
in aviation, which can be interpreted 
as the deconstruction of the traditional 
order of central control, triggered by 
the implementation of smart technol-
ogy. The invention of a hybrid system 
gave rise to another mode of govern-
ance (decentralized self-organization – 
mode B), which nowadays co-exists – 
badly connected – with the traditional 
mode A, thus raising the question of 
future options that may combine fea-
tures of the two modes of governance 
(mode C). Currently experiments take 
place in aviation (as well as in other 
traffic systems such as road traffic or 
railway transportation), which aim at 
exploring the practicability of new sys-
tem's architectures with different mix-
tures of humans and non-humans, of 
central control and decentralized self-
organization. It is still an open ques-
tion, which kind of order will succeed, 
but the outline of the different paths to 
future aviation (chapter 4.4) supports 
the assumption that strategies of a 
complete displacement of the human 
decision maker will probably prove to 
be a dead end. Even in future, aviation 
will remain a hybrid system of distrib-
uted agency, where good solutions for 
the management of crisis have to be 
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established in order to achieve a high 
level of safety. 
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